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Students of constitutional law provide two kinds of explanations
for judicial decisions.  Law professors traditionally emphasize the in-
ternal or constitutional law foundations for judicial rulings.  These in-
clude the constitutional text, past precedent, the original
understanding of the persons responsible for constitutional language
and fundamental constitutional values.1  Political scientists more com-
monly focus on the external and institutional foundations for judicial
decisions.  These include life tenure, the structure of partisan composi-
tion, the behavior of those persons responsible for staffing the federal
judiciary, and broader cultural forces.2
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  I am very,
very grateful to everyone at the Howard Law Journal for their editing and forbearance.
1. For one account of the different forms of constitutional arguments, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1992).
2. For the variety of institutional and external forces that political scientists claim influence
judicial decision making, see HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: VOL-
UME I: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 14-18 (2013).
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Internal and external explanations for judicial decision-making as
much complement as conflict with each other.  Black letter law mat-
ters.3  Scholars have identified various “jurisprudential regimes,” ac-
cepted modes of analysis in particular areas of constitutional law,
which limit the influence of judicial policy preferences and political
pressures on judicial decision-making.4  Howard Gillman, in his ac-
claimed The Constitution Besieged, documents how late nineteenth
century judges who favored laissez-faire sometimes sustained what
they thought were misguided state regulations when such laws could
be justified within the dominant constitutional ethos of the Republi-
can Era, which regarded as constitutional any state law that was de-
signed to promote the public welfare and was based on real
differences between the social class being regulated and the social
class that remained unregulated.5  Judicial values matter as well.  Ju-
risprudential regimes structure but do not compel most judicial deci-
sions. All the Justices in Muller v. Oregon, regardless of their beliefs
about the merits of laws limiting the hours women worked, agreed
that real differences between men and women provided a sufficient
constitutional foundation for such regulations.6  The Justices on the
Fuller Court, however, disputed whether real differences between
bakers and other workers provided a sufficient foundation for laws
limiting the hours that bakers worked.7 Most Americans before the
Civil War acknowledged that Congress could not prohibit slavery
within a state,8 but attitudes about the morality of slavery influenced
constitutional decisions on whether Congress could prohibit slavery in
American territories.9
Scholars have proposed three different theories about what val-
ues influence judicial decision making.  Some theories claim that Jus-
tices with life tenure are better positioned than elected officials to
champion constitutional protections for powerless minorities. Frank
3. For a general discussion on this point, see Mark A. Graber, Looking off the Ball: Consti-
tutional Law and American Politics, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS (2010).
4. Herbert M. Kritzer & Mark J. Richards, Jurisprudential Regimes and Supreme Court
Decisionmaking: The Lemon Regime and Establishment Clause Cases, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 827
(2003); Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Deci-
sion Making, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 305, 305 (2002).
5. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCH-
NER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 61-62 (1993).
6. See generally Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
8. See ABRAHAM LINCOLN, FIRST INAUGURAL ADDRESS—FINAL TEXT, 4 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 263 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
9. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 529-633 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting).
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Michelman maintains, “[j]udges perhaps enjoy a situational advantage
over the people at large in listening for voices from the margins.”10  A
second family of theories suggests that Justices are more sensitive to
the concerns of the most fortunate American citizens.  Robert Dahl
thinks, “it would appear, on political grounds, somewhat unrealistic to
suppose that a Court whose members are recruiting in the fashion of
Supreme Court Justices would long hold to norms of Right or Justice
substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”11  The third
family of theories emphasizes how judicial values align with those of
most elected officials.  Finley Peter Dunne’s Mr. Dooley articulated
the most famous expression of this view when, commenting on the
Insular Cases,12 he wrote, “no matter whether th’ constitution follows
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ iliction returns.”13
Elite polarization, conflict extension and electoral volatility con-
found these theories about the values underlying most judicial deci-
sions and the probable direction of judicial decision making.  Claims
that Supreme Court Justices are unlikely to be “substantially at odds
with the rest of the political elite” border on the trivial or absurd dur-
ing periods of elite polarization and conflict extension, when the polit-
ical elite is divided between those persons who hold the most liberal
and those persons who hold the most conservative positions on almost
all constitutional issues of the day. Judicial decisions in these circum-
stances either side with some elites against others or take positions
between the contending elite voices.  Justices when elites are polarized
bitterly dispute what constitutes “listening for voices from the mar-
gins.”  Liberal elites presently claim that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Romer v. Evans striking down a state constitutional amendment
prohibiting any official measure banning discrimination against gays
and lesbians14 protected a powerless minority by preventing the state
of Colorado from “singling out a certain class of citizens for disfa-
vored legal status or general hardships,”15 or so Justice Kennedy
claimed in his majority opinion.  Conservative elites complain that the
decision in Romer sided with “the knights rather than the villeins”16 of
10. Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1537 (1988).
11. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957).
12. See generally Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW,
THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006).
13. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
14. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
15. Id. at 633.
16. Id. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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American constitutional politics, or so Justice Scalia claimed in his dis-
sent.  Common claims that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns are unhelpful during periods of electoral volatility and divided
government.  Justices who follow the 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2010 elec-
tions make conservative decisions.  Justices who follow the 2006, 2008,
and 2012 elections make liberal decisions.  Whether Justices who fol-
low all election returns in the twenty-first century should make a mix
of liberal and conservative decisions or more often split the difference
between Republicans and Democrats is unclear.  Common claims that
the Supreme Court is a “majoritarian institution”17 rarely specify
whether the majority in question consists of the voters in the most
recent presidential election,18 voters in the most recent Senate elec-
tion, voters in the most recent House election, voters in the most re-
cent state elections, or American citizens as measured by some public
opinion poll.  Different answers to the “which election” and “when”
questions, for the last several decades, yield very different predictions
about what judicial values will determine the direction of future judi-
cial decision making.
This Article offers a more sophisticated account of elite theory
that incorporates the crucial insights underlying claims that Justices
with life tenure will protect minority rights and claims that the Su-
preme Court follows the election returns.  Justices tend to act on elite
values because Justices are almost always selected from the most af-
fluent and highly educated stratum of Americans.  During times when
American elites support the rights of a particular unpopular minority,
a Supreme Court staffed by elites is likely to be more supportive of
those rights than elected officials more dependent on popular majori-
ties for their office.  Elections have the most impact on judicial deci-
sion making during periods when politically polarized elites dispute
what minorities and minority rights merit constitutional protection.
Put simply, the direction of judicial decision making at a given time
reflects the views of the most affluent and highly educated members
of the dominant national coalition.
The values that animate the elite members of the dominant na-
tional coalition help explain the direction of judicial decision making
for the last eighty years.  During the mid-twentieth century, most Re-
17. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-
2008, at ix (2009)
18. Assuming, of course, popular majorities and electoral majorities did not differ (similar
qualifications can be made of the other majorities noted in this sentence).
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publican and Democratic elites held more liberal positions on most
constitutional issues than less fortunate and less affluent Democrats or
Republicans.  This elite consensus minimized the impact of partisan
control of the White House and the partisan composition of the Court
on most matters of constitutional law.  Such Republican appointees as
William Brennan and Earl Warren frequently joined such Democratic
appointees as William O. Douglas and Thurgood Marshall in advanc-
ing such causes as racial equality and free speech.  At times, grumbles
about judicial activism emanated from the Democrat Felix Frank-
furter and the Republican John Harlan.  By the turn of the twenty-
first century, that consensus had dissipated.  Most Republican elites
presently take far more conservative positions on most constitutional
issues than the average Republican.  Most Democratic elites take far
more liberal positions on most constitutional issues than the average
Democrat.  One consequence of this elite polarization is that partisan
control of the White House and the partisan composition of the Court
have extraordinary influence on most matters of constitutional law.
At present, the four most liberal members of the Roberts Court are
the four Justices appointed by a Democrat.  The five most conserva-
tive Justices on that Court were appointed by a Republican.  The Su-
preme Court has often made fairly centrist decisions on the
constitutional issues of the day for the past twenty years only because
Justices O’Connor and Justice Kennedy more resemble a common
type of Republican party elite that roamed the political jungles during
the 1980s but is now largely extinct.  Should elites remain polarized
and either Justice Kennedy retire or a President of one party have the
opportunity to replace a Justice appointed by a President of the other
party, the result is likely to be either a court that is more liberal on
most constitutional issues than the average Democrat voter or a court
that is more conservative on most constitutional issues than the aver-
age Republican voter.
A closely divided bench composed of polarized elites is vulnera-
ble to what might be called constitutional yo-yos, dramatic swings in
judicial policy making on numerous policy issues.  Assume electoral
politics remains fairly volatile for the near future, with Presidents of
one party frequently replacing Presidents of the other party.  If we
also assume that Justices leave the bench at regular intervals, albeit
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longer intervals than had previous been the norm,19 the median justice
on the Supreme Court may well flip each decade between a Democrat
more liberal than the average Democrat and a Republican more lib-
eral than the average Republican.  The result will be a Supreme Court
that lurches back and forth between making relatively extreme liberal
and relatively extreme conservative decisions on the most important
constitutional issues of the day.  Judicial majorities in odd numbered
decades might strike down all restrictions on abortion, sustain all af-
firmative action policies, and insist on a strong separation between
church and state, while a change of one justice in even numbered de-
cades will lead to a tribunal that might sustain all restrictions (and
bans) on abortion, strike down any use of race in admissions or em-
ployment processes, and insist that government accommodate
religion.
These potential constitutional yo-yos threaten both the
majoritarian and the constitutional values that traditionally enjoy a
precarious balance in the American constitutional regime.20  Elite po-
larization undermines majoritarianism by grossly exaggerating the im-
pact of elections and public opinion on judicial decisions.  Small
fluctuations in public opinion and in voting behavior may induce judi-
cial decisions that lurch back and forth between relatively extreme
liberal and relatively extreme conservative opinions, even when most
citizens prefer centrist positions on issues ranging from the constitu-
tional status of abortion to the constitutional status of capital punish-
ment.  This volatility undermines constitutionalism by inhibiting such
constitutional purposes as providing credible commitments to crucial
stakeholders, maintaining the rule of law, and developing a national
commitment to a set of fundamental constitutional aspirations.21  For
these reasons, judicial minimalism during times of elite polarization
and electoral volatility has particular merit, even if such an approach
to the judicial function may disserve constitutional values during other
political periods.
19. See generally Justin Crowe & Christopher F. Karpowitz, Where Have You Gone, Sher-
man Minton? The Decline of the Short-Term Supreme Court Justice, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 425
(2007).
20. See ROBERT MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 6-8 (5th ed. 2010) (noting
the tension between “the will of the people and the rule of law”); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM INTERPRETATION 45-78 (4th ed. 1960).
21. For a general discussion of constitutional purposes, see GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2,
at 7-10.
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The following pages document how elite opinion structures the
path of judicial decision making and how the present structure threat-
ens both majoritarianism and constitutionalism.  Part I examines
scholarly and popular claims that the Supreme Court has special ca-
pacities to protect minorities, is tethered to elite opinion, or relig-
iously follows the election returns.  Each theory explains some
important judicial decisions, but fails to explain other equally impor-
tant judicial decisions.  All are often elaborated so as to be almost
unfalsifiable.  Supreme Court Justices, no matter how they decide
most cases, protect some minorities, advance values held by some elite
faction, and support the constitutional vision of some recent electoral
winners.  Part II proposes that Supreme Court commentary pay spe-
cial attention to those elites most likely to gain federal judicial ap-
pointments.  This approach combines insights from elite theory
(Justices are elites who hold elite values), electoral theory (elections
determine what elites are appointed to the federal bench), and minor-
ity rights theory (whose voices from the margins do those particular
elites hear).  Unlike conventional elite theory, the theory outlined in
this paper explains which elite values the Supreme Court articulates
during times of elite polarization, namely those elite factions that most
influence the judicial selection process. Part III details how this ver-
sion of elite theory explains the pattern of judicial decision making
during the mid-twentieth century.  Warren Court activism took place
during a time of elite consensus.  Such judicial decisions as Brown v.
Board of Education22 and Engle v. Vitale23 reflected the tendency of
both Republican and Democrat legal elites to hold more liberal values
on racial and religious issues than less affluent and less well-educated
Republicans and Democrats.  Part IV details how the changes in the
structure of elite opinion that began to occur during the last decades
of the twentieth century changed voting patterns on the Supreme
Court. The present polarization on the Supreme Court reflects the
present polarization of elite opinion.  Most Justices hold either the rel-
atively extreme liberal opinions typical of highly educated, affluent
Democrats or the relatively extreme conservative opinions typical of
highly educated, affluent Republicans.  The extremist tendencies of
most American elites have nevertheless been held in check only be-
22. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson holding that separate
facilities for blacks and whites are inherently unequal).
23. See generally 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding voluntary non-denominational school prayer
to violate the Establishment Clause).
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cause a representative of a rapidly becoming extinct species of elite
moderate has held the median position on the Supreme Court for the
past twenty years.  As a result, that tribunal has often announced cen-
trist solutions to political and constitutional controversies that po-
larized elected politicians cannot achieve.  Whether that center can
hold is doubtful.  The median justice of the near future is likely to be a
more typical contemporary Republican elite or a more typical Demo-
crat elite.  So staffed, the Supreme Court will either hand down rela-
tively extreme opinions on almost all constitutional questions or,
should Americans continue to experience electoral volatility, oscillate
between relatively extreme liberal and relatively conservative posi-
tions on the constitutional issues of the day.  Part V discusses how a
court composed of an unstable group of polarized elites undermines
popular sovereignty and the rule of law.  Judicial decisions in these
circumstances neither reflect the more centrist commitments of the
voting public nor articulate durable constitutional values.  Judges can
mitigate the baneful combination of elite polarization and electoral
volatility, the Article concludes, only by practicing strong forms of ju-
dicial minimalism.  Even if judicial activism is often justified in light of
a judicial obligation to articulate fundamental constitutional truths,
Justices considering whether to hand down broad constitutional rul-
ings should have a greater degree of confidence than they can have at
present that their decisions will not be overruled within the decade.
“Extreme” or “relatively extreme” in this Article refers only to
sociological facts about where a particular belief belongs on the spec-
trum of public opinion at a given time, not to the normative merits of
either extreme or moderate views.  Persons who hold such views as
“abortion ought never be regulated” or “abortion ought never be le-
gal” are “relative extremists” at present only because most contempo-
rary Americans hold the more centrist opinion that abortion ought to
be legal but heavily regulated.  Such relatively extreme pro-life or pro-
choice opinions may be sound morality or constitutional law.  History
may vindicate one side to the debate over abortion just as history has
vindicated the relative extremists of past eras who thought slavery
ought to be abolished, women ought to have the same rights as men,
government should not mandate the one true religion, and criminal
defendants should have rights to an attorney.
Nevertheless, the sociological status of particular constitutional
beliefs has normatively relevant consequences.  Judicial decisions that
articulate what some Justices and their elite supporters regard as nor-
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matively desirable constitutional values may have less normatively de-
sirable consequences.  Backlash is one such unfortunate possibility.
Many commentators insist that some Supreme Court decisions pro-
moting what the commentator agrees are fundamental human and
constitutional rights have inspired a contrary political mobilization
that resulted in what the commentator claims is a less just status quo.24
This paper suggests that severe constitutional instability may be an-
other untoward consequence of commitments to judicial activism in
the wrong time and place.  Advocates of same-sex marriage and the
right to bear arms may well be championing compelling constitutional
values.  Whether those and other constitutional values are best served
by aggressive judicial decisions that may not survive the next series of
elections is a question that may haunt Americans if we continue to
live in a regime structured by elite polarization, conflict extension and
electoral volatility.
I. LIFE TENURE, ELITE STATUS, AND ELECTORAL
RETURNS IN ISOLATION
A general consensus exists that judicial values have at least some
influence on judicial decision making some of the time.  Leading polit-
ical scientists write as if voting on the Supreme Court is determined
almost entirely by values and policy preferences.  Jeffrey Segal and
Harold Spaeth, the most prominent proponents of the attitudinal
model of Supreme Court decision making, bluntly state, “Justices
make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their
ideological attitudes and values.”25  Those law professors and judges
who scorn social science efforts to discount the influence of law on
judges nevertheless recognize that an empirical theory of judicial deci-
sion making cannot altogether ignore judicial values.  Herbert Wechs-
ler in his famous “Neutral Principles” lecture recognized that
constitutional decisions “involve a choice among competing values”26
in those numerous cases in which “the language of the Constitution, of
24. See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS,
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013) (discussing the backlash sur-
rounding gay marriage).  For an argument against backlash, see generally Robert Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373
(2007).
25. JEFFRETY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDI-
NAL MODEL REVISITED 110 (2002).




history and precedent . . . do not combine to make an answer clear.”27
Even Justice Scalia thinks that one virtue of originalism is that “the
inevitable tendency of judges to think the law is what they would like
it to be will . . . cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made
in the direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern
values.”28
Questions about what judicial values influence judicial decisions
have received far less scholarly attention than questions about
whether values in general influence judicial decisions.  Political scien-
tists debate the extent to which Justices base constitutional decisions
on the same balance of policy preferences and values as do other offi-
cial decision makers, but do not consider whether Justices as a group
have the same policy preferences and values as other official decision
makers or a specific group of official decision makers.29  Law profes-
sors debate the extent to which law mandates that Justices make cer-
tain decisions on their best understanding of such values as equality
and liberty.30  They rarely explore whether judicial understandings of
such values as equality and liberty resemble those of other governing
officials or some group of citizens.  One consequence of these debates
is we know a good deal more about how beliefs about free speech
influence Supreme Court decisions in First Amendment cases than
why some Justices value speech more than others and why, at least in
the twentieth century, most Justices valued speech more than the av-
erage citizen and elected official.
Three theories about judicial values are nevertheless fairly ex-
plicit in the literature on Supreme Court decision making.  The first
maintains that Justices who have life tenure are more likely than aver-
age citizens and elected officials to protect minorities.  The second
maintains that Justices, who are almost always well-educated affluent
lawyers, are likely to hold those values widely held by other well-edu-
cated affluent lawyers.  The third suggests that Justices will follow the
electoral returns, either because they are appointed by electoral win-
ners or, if they are appointed by officials who have since become elec-
27. Id. at 17.
28. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
29. See generally Post & Segal, supra note 24; Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with
It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 465 (2001).
30. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKINGS RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1978) (calling for a “fusion
of constitutional law and moral theory”). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
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toral losers, because they fear the consequences of challenging
electoral winners.
A Life-Tenured Supreme Court Protects Minorities.  One popular
theory of Supreme Court decision making claims that Justices recog-
nize a special judicial responsibility to protect minority rights.  Chief
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone in United States v. Carolene Products Co.
called for “more search judicial inquiry” when official actions were
motivated by “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”31
Subsequent commentary maintained that this famous footnote four
asserted both a normative theory about the values that should moti-
vate Justices and an empirical theory about the values that actually did
motivate Justices.  “The great and modern charter for ordering the
relation between judges and other agencies of government,” Owen
Fiss writes, “is footnote four of Carolene Products.”32  Judges and
scholars agree.  “Under our constitutional system,” Hugo Black stated
in Chambers v. State of Florida, “courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because
they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-con-
forming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”33  Professor
Geoffrey Hazzard expressed much conventional wisdom when he
stated, “The institution of judicial review protects minority ‘rights’
against ‘faction.’”34
Life tenure provides two good reasons for thinking that Supreme
Court Justices will act on different values than elected officials and
that these differences will often lead courts to be sensitive to the
needs of politically vulnerable populations.  Justices who do not have
to seek reelection are far freer to protect unpopular persons and
groups than persons who depend on popular support for their offices.
American Justices who have made unpopular decisions have never
lost their jobs or lives.  At worst, such decisions have not been imple-
mented.  Moreover, Justices who have served for decades are likely to
have different values than recently elected officials.  For this reason,
the Supreme Court is likely to protect former members of a majority
coalition should they become politically vulnerable minorities.35
31. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
32. Owen Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979).
33. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
34. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1277 n.200
(1991).
35. See generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITU-
TIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003) (discussing the insurance function of judicial review).
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Many important Supreme Court decisions have protected politi-
cally vulnerable minorities.  Such cases as Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion36 and Loving v. Virginia37 ruled that racial majorities could not
establish a racial caste system in the United States.  “Measures de-
signed to maintain White Supremacy,” Chief Justice Warren stated in
Loving, constitute the “invidious racial discrimination” prohibited by
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38  Consti-
tutional criminal procedure provides even clearer instances of courts
listening to the politically powerless.  Elected officials have almost no
incentive to adopt policies protecting the rights of ordinary criminals.
Even during the decade when successful candidates for the presidency
asserted that “some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far
in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this
country,”39 the Supreme Court of the United States first declared and
then refused to overrule decisions forbidding prosecutors from intro-
ducing in criminal trials illegally obtained evidence40 and requiring
that police warn all persons they arrested that they have a right to
keep silent and a right to an attorney.41  While Richard Nixon was
president, the Justices declared unconstitutional every state statute au-
thorizing capital punishment.42  As Amy Lerman notes, during the
1960s and 1970s, “the Supreme Court bolstered the due process rights
of the accused, even as the public by and large preferred to strengthen
prosecutorial power.”43
The primary problem with claims that Justices protect minority
rights or have “special capacities to listen to voices from the margins”
is that such capacities seem to have lain dormant throughout much of
American constitutional history.  More often than not, federal and
state courts have sided with employers rather than employees.44  Vic-
toria Hattam and William Forbath detail how judicial resistance to
legislation aimed at improving working conditions led mainstream un-
36. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. See generally 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. Id. at 11.
39. See President Richard Nixon, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, Florida (Aug. 8, 1968).
40. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
41. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
42. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
43. Amy E. Lerman, The Rights of the Accused, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY 41 (Nathaniel Persily, Jack Citrin, & Patrick J. Egan eds., 2008).
44. See Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor, and the Anti-
Union Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 582-84 (2012).
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ions at the turn of the twentieth century to eschew political action,
preferring to secure gains through collective bargaining consistent
with the common law of contract.45  With rare exceptions, nineteenth
century courts were far more attentive to the concerns of slaveholders
and white supremacists than the plight of slaves and free African
Americans.  The antebellum Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
federal laws banning human bondage in the territories.46  The postbel-
lum court imposed sharp constitutional limitations on federal power
to promote racial equality in the south47 and blessed the rise of Jim
Crow segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson.48 Bolling v. Sharpe49 is the
first instance when the Supreme Court declared a federal policy un-
constitutional that championed the rights of the sort of “discrete and
insular minority” that much progressive theory suggests courts are in-
stitutionally designed to protect.
Claims that the Supreme Court protects minorities also suffer
from a falsification problem.  All parties to constitutional debates
throughout American history have claimed to be members of the sort
of politically disadvantaged group that needs judicial protection.
Slaveholders and antebellum southerners claimed to be powerless mi-
norities.50  When Supreme Court Justices in the nineteenth century
complained about the tyranny of the majority, their concern was with
laws passed by the less affluent many that took property from the
more fortunate few.51  Justice O’Connor in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson insisted that white contractors disadvantaged by affirmative
45. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVE-
MENT 128-76 (1991); VICTORIA HATTAM, LABOR VISIONS AND STATE POWER: THE ORIGINS OF
BUSINESS UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3-30 (1993).
46. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1893).
48. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that based on the Four-
teenth Amendment, a Louisiana-based law mandating that African Americans can only sit in
separate but equal railway cars was constitutional).
49. See generally Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that African American
children are deprived of equal protection found in the Fifth Amendment when segregated in
public schools).
50. See generally JESSE T. CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY, 1789-1861:
A STUDY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1930) (examining the “minority philosophy” in the South
during the antebellum period).
51. The Supreme Court referenced that in strong examples like in the taxation of railroads
there are rights beyond the control of the state and that if the government “recognized no such
rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all time to the
absolute disposition and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power
. . . .” The Court then says that “[t]he theory of our governments, State and National, is opposed
to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere.” See Citizens’ Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Topeka,
87 U.S. 655, 662 (1874).
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action were powerless victims of a local African American majority.52
Other contemporary minorities arguably include Christian parents
who object to certain materials in the public school curriculum, Mus-
lims who are victims of ethnic profiling, atheists who object to refer-
ences to “God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, and billionaires who wish
to make large campaign contributions.  No Supreme Court Justice
supports all these persons, all of whom claim to be minority victims of
the majoritarian processes.
The Supreme Court and Elites.  Robert Dahl and others suggest
that the Supreme Court is more responsive to elites than to powerless
minorities, that “a Court whose members are recruited in the fashion
of Supreme Court justices would [not] long hold to norms of Right or
Justice substantially at odds with the rest of the political elite.”53  Lu-
cas Powe observes, “justices are . . . subject to the same economic,
social, and intellectual currents as other upper-middle-class profes-
sional elites.”54  Lawrence Baum maintains that Supreme Court Jus-
tices make those decisions that they believe will be approved by elite
lawyers, journalists, and interest group leaders.  Baum and Neil
Devins speak of the “Greenhouse effect, whereby Justices shift their
views to reflect the left-leaning values of media and academic
elites.”55  Most Justices, understandably, do not claim that they re-
present the most fortunate Americans, but such criticisms are often
heard in judicial dissents. The Court, Justice Scalia complains, “has no
business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the
elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected.”56
Common sense and scholarly analysis provide good reason for
thinking that judicial decisions often reflect elite sentiment.  Virtually
every judge who has ever sat on the Supreme Court in American his-
tory has had more education and more wealth than the average Amer-
ican at the time.57 The materials Supreme Court Justices read when
deciding cases are almost exclusively prepared by other educated, af-
52. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989).
53. Dahl, supra note 11, at 291.
54. POWE, supra note 17, at ix.
55. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1543 (2010); see LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR
AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 142 (2006) (discussing the Greenhouse
effect).
56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 601-02 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 48-49 (5th ed. 2008).
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fluent elites.58  Supreme Court Justices tend to socialize almost exclu-
sively with their highly educated, affluent peers.59  Baum and Devins,
who have looked at elite influence on Supreme Court decisions at
great length, conclude that
Because the individuals and groups most salient to the Justices are
overwhelmingly from elite segments of American society, it is the
values and opinions of elites that have the greatest impact on the
Justices. This is one important reason why Court decisions typically
accord with the views of the most educated people better than they
do with the views of the public as a whole. More to the point, the
Justices advance their personal preferences by attending both to
their preferred vision of legal policy and to the reference groups
that matter most to them. Consequently, although the Justices will
not diverge sharply from policy positions they strongly favor, the
departures they do make are more likely to reflect their personal
reference groups than the popular will.60
Many important Supreme Court decisions reflect the influence of
elite attitudes.  Such Marshall Court decisions as McCulloch v. Mary-
land61 and Gibbons v. Ogden62 expressed the Federalist/National Re-
publican vision of federal power to promote commercial prosperity
held by most early nineteenth century commercial elites.63  During the
late nineteenth century, when most American elites favored reconcili-
ation with the South, the Supreme Court was generally hostile to ra-
cial equality.64  As American elites began to reject theories of
58. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1566-68.
59. See BAUM, supra note 55, at 89-90.
60. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1580-81.
61. See generally M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (holding that Maryland cannot
tax a branch of the Bank of United States because the Bank is a means employed by the govern-
ment, which is executing its constitutional powers).
62. See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (holding that when affecting com-
merce, conflicting state claims of sovereignty over bodies of navigable water are subordinate to
the legislation of Congress and that any concurrent power is limited power vested in the sover-
eignty of Congress).
63. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 96-97.
64. See Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 973, 1003-05 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)). See gener-
ally Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (holding that as the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution prohibits the discrimination of citizens by the government based on race, the
constitution and laws of Mississippi setting requirements for voter registration including poll
taxes and literacy and a grandfather clause to bypass strict requirements for whites were consti-
tutional as they did not discriminate against races); Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(upholding Louisiana laws requiring blacks and whites to sit in separate but equal cars during
intrastate travel because the legislation is reasonable); DAVID W. BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION:
THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY (2002).
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scientific racism, the Supreme Court became more supportive of racial
equality.65  Baum and Devins point to numerous contemporary judi-
cial decisions on constitutional issues ranging from flag burning to af-
firmative action, where persons with post-graduate degrees are far
more likely to prefer the policy made by the Justices than less edu-
cated Americans.66
The data Baum and Devins use to support claims that Justices
advance elite values nevertheless raises questions about their thesis.
While elites showed greater tendencies to support contemporary Su-
preme Court decisions than other Americans, on no issue for which
Baum and Devins presented data did a clear majority of persons with
post-graduate degrees support a decision that was opposed by a ma-
jority of persons who lacked a post-graduate degree.67  More than half
of all persons with and without post-graduate degrees opposed the
Supreme Court’s decisions on school prayer, affirmative action and
flag burning. Judicial decisions on homosexual relations and juvenile
death penalty are favored by majorities with and without post-gradu-
ate degrees.  In short, claims that Justices promote elite values do not
explain why the Justices frequently disagree with elite majorities and
why, when they do agree with elite majorities, they typically agree
with (smaller) popular majorities.
The claim that the Supreme Court champions elite values suffers
from the same lack of specificity that weakens claims that the Su-
preme Court protects minorities.  Most constitutional struggles fea-
ture American aristocrats on all sides.  Slaveholders were part of the
American elite, but so were the Boston Brahmins who provided sup-
port for John Brown.68  Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas were
elite members of the Illinois bar.  The Civil Rights movement pitted
65. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 210-11 (2004). See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of children based on race, even when physical
location and facilities may be equal, is unconstitutional based on the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated when an African American appli-
cant was denied admissions to the University of Texas Law School based solely on race because
a newly opened school only for blacks was not an adequate comparable level of education);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (holding that because the United States is a constitu-
tional democracy, law grants the rights of citizens to participate in elections without state restric-
tion of race).
66. See Baum & Devins, supra note 55, at 1573.
67. Boumediene v. Bush was supported by exactly half of persons with a post-graduate de-
gree and opposed by two-thirds of persons who lacked such a degree. See Baum & Devins,
supra note 55, at 1573.
68. See BRIAN MCGINTY, JOHN BROWN’S TRIAL 44 (2009).
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northern elites against southern elites.  Robert Dahl, who penned the
seminal statement of elite theory,69 also published an exceptionally
influential study in political science maintaining that the United States
is governed by different elite factions, each of which holds sway over
some but not all policy arenas. Who Governs contended, “individuals
who are influential in one sector of public activity tend not to be influ-
ential in another sector; and, what is probably more significant, the
social strata from which individuals in one sector tend to come are
different from the social strata from which individuals in other sectors
are drawn.”70  To the extent American politics is structured by what
Dahl characterized as “dispersed inequalities,”71 the most important
question for thinking about judicial review is not whether the Court
advances elite values, but which elite values does the Court advance.
Little research has been done on that precise question.
The Supreme Court and Election Returns/Public Opinion.  Much
commentary asserts that Supreme Court Justices hold and act on the
same values that motivate elected officials and the general public.
The strong version of regime theory in political science maintains that
Justices carry out the policy agenda of the dominant national coali-
tion.  Bradley Joondeph states, “the Court tends to function more as a
policy-making partner of the ascendant political majority—or at least
an influential segment of that majority—than as an independent check
on the political process.”72  Terri Peretti endorses a regime politics ap-
proach that focuses on how “elected officials enlist the Court as a
partner in their electoral and policy aims.”73  Prominent law profes-
sors insist that Justices work within parameters marked out by public
opinion.  Michael Klarman declares, “the Court identifies and protects
minority rights only when a majority or near majority of the commu-
nity has come to deem those rights worthy of protection.”74  Barry
Friedman’s history of judicial power chronicles how “the Supreme
69. Dahl, supra note 11, at 291.
70. ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY
169 (1961).
71. Id. at 228.
72. Bradley W. Joondeph, Judging and Self-Presentation: Towards a More Realistic Concep-
tion of the Human (Judicial) Animal, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 523, 553 (2008).
73. Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
273, 275 (2010) (“[R]ather than a check on majority power, the federal courts often function as
arenas for extending, legitimizing, harmonizing, or protecting the policy agenda of political elites
or groups within the dominant governing coalition.”).
74. Michael Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1, 17-18 (1996).
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Court went from being an institution intended to check the popular
will to one that frequently confirms it.”75
Good reasons exist for thinking that judges are likely to hold or
at least articulate the values of political winners and popular majori-
ties.  Both social science evidence and common sense provide over-
whelming support for the notion that elected officials seek to appoint
persons to the bench they believe share their constitutional vision.
Henry Abraham declares,
Whatever the merits of the other criteria attending presidential
motivations in appointments may be, what must be of overriding
concern to any nominator is his perception of the candidate’s real
politics.  The chief executive’s crucial predictive judgment concerns
itself with the nominee’s likely future voting pattern on the bench,
based on his or her past stance and commitment on matters of pub-
lic policy insofar as they are reliably discernible.  All presidents
have tried, thus, to pack the bench to a greater or lesser extent.
They will indubitably continue to do so.76
Judicial majorities pull punches rather than risk reprisal on matters on
which the judges disagree with popular sentiment.  “I am not fond of
butting against a wall in sport,” John Marshall told Joseph Story when
explaining why he refused as a circuit court judge to strike down a
Virginia law forbidding African American seamen from entering the
state.77  The forces that influence popular opinion also influence Jus-
tices.  Benjamin Cardozo observed, the “great tides and currents
which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass
judges by.”78
Many important Supreme Court decisions are best explained, at
least in part, by election returns or popular opinion.  Shortly after
President Grant appointed two Republican Justices to the Supreme
Court, the 5-3 judicial majority that declared unconstitutional the Le-
gal Tender Acts passed during the Civil War79 became a 5-4 majority
that claimed Article I authorized the United States to make paper
money legal payment for all debts.80  John Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison81 would have almost certainly ordered the Jefferson Admin-
75. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2009).
76. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 53.
77. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 86 (1922).
78. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
79. See generally Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869).
80. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457, 501(1871).
81. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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istration to give Marbury his judicial commission had the Federalist
Party retained strong control over both houses of Congress in the 1800
national election.82  The unanimous Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Nixon83 was no doubt influenced by the strong popular tide
against Richard Nixon during his last months in office.
The main problem with drawing too tight connections between
Supreme Court decisions and election returns or popular opinion is
that both approaches to judicial decision making predict far less judi-
cial activism than has historically been the case.  If the Supreme Court
religiously followed election returns, we might expect the Justices to
declare federal laws unconstitutional only when the coalition that
passed those laws has been electorally deposed.  This is not the case.
Tom Keck’s study of judicial decision making at the turn of the
twenty-first century observed that, “Though this Court never included
more than two Democratic appointees, more than 70% of its judicial
review decisions were issued by bipartisan coalitions, and more than
80% invalidated statutes that had been enacted with substantial Re-
publican legislative support.”84  The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA) and the American Disabilities Act (ADA) are two good
examples of statutes whose fate was not forecast by strong regime
politics models of constitutional politics.  Both were passed by over-
whelming bipartisan legislative majorities. A unanimous Supreme
Court declared RFRA unconstitutional.85  The five most conservative
Justices on the Rehnquist Court struck down crucial provisions of the
ADA,86 a statute that President Bush declared to be an “historic act”
that “made the United States the international leader on this human
rights issue.”87  Public opinion polls are similarly weak predictors of
judicial decision making.  Although nearly two-thirds of all Rehnquist
Court decisions were consistent with the trend of public opinion
(where such a trend could be determined), only two-fifths of that tri-
bunal’s decisions declaring federal laws unconstitutional and less than
three-fifths of decisions declaring state laws unconstitutional reflected
82. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 25-28.
83. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
84. Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Fed-
eral Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 336 (2007).
85. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997).
86. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
87. President George Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of




public opinion.88  Among the important decisions that bucked public
opinion were those prohibiting prayer exercises in public schools89
and striking down laws banning flag-burning.90
Claims that the Supreme Court follows election returns or public
opinion either suffer falsifiability problems or are simply not helpful
when the election returns or public opinion are not moving in clear
directions.  Americans for nearly fifty years have experienced this rel-
ative political instability.  Thirteen of the seventeen national elections
held between 1980 and 2012 resulted in divided government.  The pe-
riod between 1936 and 1948 is the last in which a party won more than
three consecutive presidential elections.  Even when one party con-
trolled all branches of the national government, the ruling majority in
Congress often had a quite different ideological bent than the Presi-
dent of the United States.  Conservative Southern Democrats during
the New Deal Era controlled crucial Congressional committees even
as liberals exercised greater power in the White House.91  Under these
conditions, commentators will almost always be able to find some
election returns consistent with particular Supreme Court decisions
and some election returns inconsistent with those decisions.  Ameri-
cans in 1984 elected a President who ran on a strong pro-life platform
but in 1986 returned control of the Senate to the party committed to
keeping abortion legal.  Depending on which election return one se-
lected, persons attempting to forecast the Supreme Court’s decisions
in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services92 and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey93 would have predicted that the
Supreme Court would overrule Roe v. Wade,94 overrule decisions per-
mitting states not to fund abortion,95 or find some middle ground on
abortion that was escaping both political parties.  Should the Roberts
Court declare unconstitutional recent state laws requiring women
seeking abortion to have ultrasounds before undergoing that proce-
dure,96 the Justices can be said to be following the 2012 presidential
88. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT 44 ( 2008).
89. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Eichmann, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989); MARSHALL, supra note 88, at 24.
91. See NICOL RAE, SOUTHERN DEMOCRATS 12-13 (1994).
92. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
93. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
94. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
96. See Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 578 (5th
Cir. 2012).
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election.  Should those laws be sustained, the Justices can be said to be
following the 2012 House of Representatives election.
II. LIFE TENURE, ELITE STATUS, AND ELECTORAL
RETURNS IN COMBINATION
Common claims that life-tenured judges protect powerless minor-
ities, promote elite values, or follow the election returns often sound
better in theory than they work in practice.  Good reason exists for
thinking that life tenured Justices will be more inclined than elected
officials to protect the unpopular, that Justices who hail from Ivy law
schools and earn six-digit salaries in bad years will be more inclined
than less educated or affluent Americans to act as an American aris-
tocracy, or that Justices appointed by elected officials will follow the
election returns.  The problem is that for every instance that supports
one of these theories, an equally prominent counterexample exists.
Worse, each common claim about judicial values suffers from falsifica-
tion problems.  Most cases before the Supreme Court pit one minority
against another, one elite against another, and the winner of some
recent elections against the winner of other recent elections. Com-
mentary on judicial review, for this reason, must be more specific.
Scholars must detail which minorities Justices protect, which elites
they represent, and what election returns they follow.
The most basic problem with the three above explanations for
judicial decision making is that each fails to take the insights of the
others into account.  Elite theorists explore how affluent well-edu-
cated judges make decisions, not how those decisions are made by
affluent well-educated judges who, after being appointed by electoral
winners, enjoy life tenure.  This myopic approach is mistaken and not
just because not all factors are considered as discrete influences on the
Supreme Court.  Students of intersectionally point out that the exper-
iences of a lesbian black woman cannot be broken down into discrete
race, gender, and sexuality components.97 For similar reasons, theories
of judicial making should focus on how life tenured Justices who are
appointed to office by political winners interpret the Constitution in
light of their elite values.  Rather than engage in a contest to deter-
mine which variable explains the most judicial decisions, scholars will
97. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989).
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be better off detailing how life tenure, elite status, and election returns
combine to structure the direction of constitutional law.
Life tenure, elite status, and election returns in combination help
explain some problems that plagued each factor in isolation as an ex-
planation for judicial decision making.  Consider the ways in which
judicial decision making during the nineteenth century seems inconsis-
tent with common claims that courts are structured to protect power-
less minorities.98  That difficulty vanishes when changing conceptions
of elite understandings of powerlessness are taken into account.  Most
elites during the nineteenth century thought affluent property holders
were the paradigmatic politically vulnerable minority.  James Madison
in 1829 declared,
[P]ersons now and property are the two great subjects on which
Governments are to act; and that the rights of persons, and the
rights of property, are the objects, for the protection of which Gov-
ernment was instituted.  These rights cannot well be separated.  The
personal right to acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to
property, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.  The
essence of Government is power; and power, lodged as it must be in
human hands, will ever be liable to abuse. . . .  In republics, the great
danger is, that the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of
the minority.99
These elite attitudes explain why the affluent, well-educated Justices
who sat on the Supreme Court during the nineteenth century con-
cluded that corporations were citizens,100 adopted a railroad friendly
interpretation of the commerce clause,101 and tended to prefer the
rights of slaveholders to the rights of alleged slaves.102  The course of
Supreme Court decision making changed, unsurprisingly, when in the
minds of most elites the poor person of color replaced the successful
capitalist as the “discrete and insular minorit[y]”103 most vulnerable to
the prejudices of popular majorities.
Greater attention to the structure of elite competition helps alle-
viate other difficulties with common single-factor theories of judicial
policymaking.  The elites who contested the constitutionality and mo-
98. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
99. 9 JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention, in THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 360-61 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910).
100. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
101. Wabash, St. Louis Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 589-93 (1886).
102. See generally Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (holding a Pennsylvania statute
granting procedural protections to escaped slaves to violate the Constitution).
103. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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rality of human bondage were not equally situated politically.  Jackso-
nian presidents routinely appointed southerners and northern
doughfaces to the federal bench.104  Abolitionists did not win elections
and, as a result, were underrepresented on the federal bench.  John
McLean was the only antislavery advocate who served on the Su-
preme Court before the Civil War and his antislavery tendencies de-
veloped only after he was appointed in 1830.105  Such decisions as
Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Dred Scott v. Sandford106 reflected elite
Jacksonian beliefs that slaveholders were a politically vulnerable mi-
nority that required special judicial protection.107  When the elites
who staffed the Supreme Court changed, the course of judicial deci-
sion-making changed.  Five of the nine Justices on the court that de-
cided Dred Scott hailed from slave states.  Seven of the nine Justices
on the court that decided Brown v. Board of Education hailed from
states that had no slaves before the Civil War.  Just as Dred Scott re-
flected the southern tilt of the Jacksonian elite, so did Brown reflect
the liberal racial sentiments of northern elites during the mid-twenti-
eth century.108
The Supreme Court is most likely to protect the rights of those
minorities whose voices are heard by the most elite members of the
dominant national coalition, but the nature of that elite changes in
ways that are important for the course of judicial decision making.
During some political eras, elections make little difference because
elites from both parties are more likely to agree with each other on
major constitutional issues than they are to agree with the average
member of their political coalitions.  The Warren Court, as we shall
see, was a product of the elite consensus that developed during the
1950s and 1960s. During other periods, elections made a big difference
because the disagreements between the elite members of the two ma-
jor parties were far greater than the disagreements between the more
plebian members of the two major parties.  The contemporary Rob-
104. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 77-93; Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in THE JUS-
TICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS
817, 817-19 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., vol. 2 1969); Frank Otto Gatell, Robert C.
Grier, in THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 873, 873 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., vol. 2 1969).
105. ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 78-79.
106. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
107. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.




erts Court, as we shall see, is a product of the elite polarization that
structures contemporary American constitutional politics.
III. ELITE CONSENSUS AND THE WARREN COURT
The Warren Court is Exhibit A for every prominent theory of
judicial decision making discussed in this paper.  The Justices made
numerous decisions, from Brown v. Board of Education to Gideon v.
Wainwright109 that apparently demonstrated how life tenured Justices
had special capacities “to listen to voices from the margins.”110  Owen
Fiss declares,
In the 1950’s, America was not a pretty sight.  Jim Crow
reigned supreme.  Blacks were systematically disenfranchised and
excluded from juries.  State fostered religious practices, like school
prayers, were pervasive.  Legislatures were grossly gerrymandered
and malapportioned.  McCarthyism stifled radical dissent, and the
jurisdiction of the censor over matters considered obscene or
libelous had no constitutional limits. . . . Trials often proceeded
without counsel or jury. Convictions were allowed to stand even
though they turned on illegally seized evidence or on statements
extracted from the accused under coercive circumstances.  There
were no rules limiting the imposition of the death penalty. These
practices victimized the poor and disadvantaged, as did the welfare
system, which was administered in an arbitrary and oppressive man-
ner.  The capacity of the poor to participate in civic activities was
also limited by the imposition of poll taxes, court filing fees, and the
like.
These were the challenges that the Warren Court took up and
spoke to in a forceful manner.  The result was a program of consti-
tutional reform almost revolutionary in its aspiration and, now and
then, in its achievements.111
The Warren Court also consistently sided with elite opinion on such
matters as the place of religion in public life when most affluent, well-
educated citizens disagreed with their less fortunate fellow citizens.
John Jeffries and James Ryan point out,
[T]he controversy over school prayer revealed a huge gap between
the cultural elite and the rest of America. People generally may
have supported school prayer and Bible reading, but the leadership
class did not. Elite support for the Supreme Court’s secularization
109. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110. Michelman, supra note 10, at 1537.
111. Owen Fiss, A Life lived Twice, 100 YALE L. J. 1117, 1118 (1991).
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project was clearly visible in the activities of law professors and
deans, in the prominent newspaper editorials endorsing Engel and
Schempp, and most importantly in the views of mainline Protestant
leaders, who overwhelmingly supported the prayer decisions and
opposed efforts to overturn them. The contrary opinions of many of
the Protestant faithful, especially conservative evangelicals, were
less visible and less influential than the announced positions of re-
ligious organizations and leaders.112
Finally, the Warren Court followed the national election returns.  Lu-
cas Powe writes,
[T]he Court was a functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liber-
alism of the mid and late 1960s. . . . The Warren Court demanded
national liberal values be adopted in outlying areas of the United
States . . . .  In the criminal procedure area, it took the lead as the
branch of government most familiar with the problems and most
capable of supervising the solutions.  The Court’s belated welfare
decisions were an assault on both national and local bureaucracies,
but in moving toward constitutionalization, the Court was several
years behind the Great Society in creating new rights.113
A broad elite consensus on civil rights and civil liberties helps
explain why life tenure, elite status, and election returns in isolation
each accounts for the path of Warren Court decision making.  During
the 1950s and 1960s, American elites in both the Republican and
Democratic parties tended to support racial equality, limiting the in-
fluence of religion in public life, broad free speech rights, and provid-
ing greater protections for poor persons and persons of color
suspected of crimes.114  Theories that the Court follows elite opinion
and theories that courts respond to elections reached similarly accu-
rate conclusions about mid-century constitutional politics because the
Republican and Democratic elites empowered by election returns had
reached similar conclusions on civil liberties and rights issues.  Moreo-
ver, because Democratic and Republican elites agreed on the power-
less minorities that need judicial protection, theories that courts
protect powerless minorities reached the same accurate conclusions
about judicial behavior during the 1950s and 1960s as theories that
emphasized elite status or election returns.
112. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 325 (2001).
113. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 494 (2000).
114. See infra notes 120-34 and accompanying text.
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The Elite Consensus.  Political science during the New Deal/Great
Society Era made sharp distinctions between elite and mass political
behavior.  Such classics as The American Voter concluded that edu-
cated Americans knew more about politics than average citizens, par-
ticipated more, and were more effective participants.115  Mainstream
commentators maintained that American politics were pluralistic,
characterized by a wide variety of interest groups competing for
power.116  Nevertheless, as E.E. Schattschneider noted, “in the plural-
ist heaven . . . the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class ac-
cent.”117  Unlike less fortunate citizens, affluent, well-educated
Americans had the capacities necessary to be good democratic citi-
zens.  “The resources of time, money, and civic skills,” disproportion-
ately possessed by elites, the leading study of political participation in
the United States concluded, “make it easier for the individual who is
predisposed to take part to do so.”118
Many prominent commentators did not worry about class differ-
ences in political knowledge and political participation.  They believed
that mass political participation threatened the American democratic
order.  Leading social scientists worried that the average American
did not know enough about American politics to participate effec-
tively and, worse, that many less fortunate citizens harbored attitudes
antithetical to democracy.  Ordinary Americans, studies found, were
far less likely than elites to be committed to such democratic values as
free speech and equal protection.119 Other studies suggested that ordi-
nary citizens had authoritarian personalities and were obedient to au-
thorities in ways that made Americans particular susceptible to
dictatorial appeals.120  After finding that one-third of American voters
had “totalitarian” attitudes, Herbert McClosky fretted that “a large
proportion of the electorate has failed to grasp certain of the underly-
ing ideas and principles on which the American political system
115. ANGUS CAMPBELL ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER: AN ABRIDGMENT 251-54 (1964).
116. DAHL, supra note 70, at 5; see also DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS:
POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION, at vii (1951).
117. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 35 (1960).
118. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 334 (1995).
119. HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE: WHAT AMERI-
CANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES 243-44 (1983).
120. See T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 759-62 (1950) (demon-
strating the connection between the success of social control and subordinates taking pleasure in
obedience); STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW (1974)
(studying the tendencies of human nature to obey).
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rests.”121  What kept American democracy afloat was elite commit-
ment to democratic values. It Can[ ] Happen Here122 was the implicit
theme of much scholarship.
Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill’s Dimensions of Tolerance
was a particularly influential statement of the gap between elite and
mass commitments to democratic rights and other civil liberties.  The
work proclaimed, “Social learning, insofar as it affects support for civil
liberties is likely to be greater among the influentials (that, is political
elites) of the society than among the mass public.”123  McCloskey and
Brill based this conclusion on a survey of ordinary citizens, community
leaders, and legal elites that asked numerous questions about constitu-
tional principles.  They discovered that leaders were far more likely to
be libertarian on rights issues than ordinary citizens and that legal
elites were far more likely to be libertarian than community leaders.
The latter conclusion was particularly important.  They stated:
It can be safely presumed, we believe, that the legal elite is
closer to other elites, and surely closer to than the mass public, to
the implicit norms of the political culture; that they are more in-
tensely involved with them; and that they respond to those norms
with greater consistency.  If civil liberties values, as we have argued,
are difficult to learn, the legal elite has more occasion to encounter
them than other samples, has greater knowledge of them, and is
more often compelled to reflect upon their merits and shortcom-
ings.  By the very nature of their vocation and activities, the mem-
bers of the legal elite would also be in the best position to
understand the reciprocal obligations that a belief in civil liberties
imposes upon the individuals who claim them for themselves.124
Studies of the new civil liberties issues that emerged in the 1970s
initially reached similar conclusions.  Attitudes on such issues as abor-
tion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) were more rooted in
class than gender.  Kristin Luker’s study of abortion politics depicted
battles over reproductive choice as being fought between women who
sought to be political and economic elites and women who preferred a
traditional homemaker role.125 “Abortion,” studies concluded, “is part
121. Herbert McClosky, Consensus and Ideology in American Politics, 58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 361, 364-65 (1964).
122. See generally SINCLAIR LEWIS, IT CAN’T HAPPEN HERE (1935) (describing how Ameri-
cans voted for a fascist, who eventually establishes a dictatorship in the United States).
123. MCCLOSKY & BRILL, supra note 119, at 233.
124. Id. at 247.
125. See generally KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984)
(examining the issues, people, and beliefs on both sides of the abortion conflict).
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of a larger cultural conflict between certain strata of the upper-middle
class—the highly educated professionals, scientists, and intellectuals—
and the mass of Americans who comprise the working and lower-mid-
dle classes.”126  One study of abortion found abnormally high levels of
pro-choice support among almost all American elites.127  Jane Man-
sbridge’s study of the politics of the ERA similarly described a battle
between different women’s groups composed of women from differ-
ent classes.128  Women in the labor force and women who had home-
maker roles, she detailed, differed far more among themselves on
gender issues than women as a whole and men.129
Elite status trumped ideology and partisanship.  Affluent, highly
educated Republicans on many civil rights and liberties issues had
more opinions in common with affluent, highly educated Democrats,
than either shared with less fortunate fellow partisans.  In many in-
stances, education and social class were more important factors than
whether a respondent identified as a conservative or liberal.  A partic-
ularly influential article in the 1964 American Political Science Review
concluded,
If American ideology is defined as that cluster of axioms, values and
beliefs which have given form and substance to American democ-
racy and the Constitution, the political influentials manifest by com-
parison with ordinary voters a more developed sense of ideology
and a firmer grasp of its essentials.  This is evidenced in their
stronger approval of democratic ideas, their greater tolerance and
regard for proper procedures and citizen rights, their superior un-
derstanding and acceptance of the “rules of the game,” and their
more affirmative attitudes toward the political system in general.130
The author, Herbert McClosky, found that, regardless of partisan pre-
disposition, elites were more likely than ordinary voters to express ba-
sic commitments to democratic principles, less likely to express racist
attitudes, far more likely to support the rights of persons suspected of
crime and less likely to want to restrict speech rights.  Speech rights
were a particular matter on which elites differed from ordinary voters.
“Not only do [elites] exhibit stronger support for democratic values
126. Peter Skerry, The Class Conflict over Abortion, 52 PUB. INT. 69, 70 (1978); see MARK A.
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS 144-45 (1996).
127. Robert Lerner et al., Abortion and Social Change in America, 27 SOC’Y 8 (1990).
128. See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986) (arguing that the
ERA failed because it did not result in substantive changes in the position of women).
129. Id. at 216-17.
130. McClosky, supra note 121, at 373.
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than does the electorate,” McClosky noted, “but they are also more
consistent in applying the general principle to the specific instance.
The average citizen has greater difficulty appreciating the importance
of certain procedural or juridical rights, especially when he believes
the country’s internal security is at stake.”131
Judicial Decision Making and the Elite Consensus. The conclu-
sions social scientists reached during the 1950s and 1960s help explain
the direction of judicial decision making through much of the middle
to late twentieth century, even though owing to the balkanization of
the political science discipline, almost all of the scholars doing the re-
search exhibited little interest in public law.  The Justices Democratic
and Republican Presidents appointed to the Supreme Court from
1930 to 1980 were drawn from the affluent, educated elite that were
the most liberal segment of American society at that time.  In virtually
every area of law in which the Justices declared significant federal or
(more often) state measures unconstitutional, public opinion surveys
demonstrated that elites were more likely than average citizens to
favor the policy made by the Supreme Court and legal elites were
more likely than other elites to favor the direction of judicial policy
making.
Consider several questions that McCloskey and Brill asked re-
spondents during the survey research they conducted for Dimensions
of Tolerance.132  One concerned attitudes on free speech.  “Should
demonstrators be allowed to hold a mass protest march for some un-
popular cause?”  Three-fifths of ordinary citizens maintained that the
demonstration should be banned “if the majority is against it.”  More
than nine-tenths of all legal elites surveyed responded that the demon-
stration should take place, “even if most people in the community
don’t want it.”  The Supreme Court in such cases as Cox v. Louisi-
ana133 and Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham134 sided with the legal elite,
holding that civil rights protestors had constitutional rights to hold
demonstrations promoting unpopular causes in the south.  McClosky
and Brill asked about “forcing people to testify against themselves in
court.”  Three-fifths of ordinary citizens thought compelled testimony
“may be necessary when [people] are accused of very brutal crimes.”
131. Id. at 366.
132. MCCLOSKY & BRILL, supra note 119, at 246.
133. See generally 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (reversing appellant’s conviction of violating a local
regulation prohibiting public demonstrations).




Almost nine-tenths of the legal elite asserted that compelled testi-
mony “is never justified, no matter how terrible the crime.”  The Su-
preme Court in Escobedo v. Illinois135 and Miranda v. Arizona136
sided with the legal elite, insisting on strong constitutional safeguards
against compelled testimony.  The same stark differences appeared
with McCloskey and Brill asked about religion.  Three quarters of all
average citizens declared that “the freedom of atheists to make fun of
God and religion should not be allowed in a public place where relig-
ious groups gather.”  Three quarters of the legal elite insisted that
such speech “should be legally protected no matter who might be of-
fended.”  Supreme Court decisions on school prayer championed the
secular values held by twentieth century American elites rather than
the more religious worldview of ordinary citizens.137
This elite consensus also marked the boundaries of liberal Su-
preme Court activism during the Warren and early Burger years.  In
sharp contrast to the structure of public opinion on almost every other
civil liberties issue, surveys found that affluent, educated Americans
were somewhat less likely than ordinary citizens to favor economic
equality.138  George Lovell’s study of the Civil Liberties Bureau of the
Justice Department documents a similarly sharp division between
what most elites and average citizens in the 1930s and 1940s thought
were civil liberties.139  Elite notions resembled those asserted in the
famous footnote four of the Carolene Products, which called for
heightened judicial scrutiny when a law “restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation” or reflects “prejudice against discrete and in-
sular minorities.”140  Civil liberties were free speech, freedom of relig-
ion, racial equality, and constitutional criminal procedure.  Lovell
found that ordinary people had far more capacious theories, many of
135. See generally 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is violated when
the accused is not permitted to consult an attorney at the point a police investigation process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory).
136. See generally 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that no rule or legislation can abrogate a
right secured by the Constitution).
137. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963) (holding daily
mandatory Bible reading in school was unconstitutional); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433
(1962) (holding New York’s laws officially prescribing the Regents’ prayer are inconsistent with
the Establishment Clause).
138. See McClosky, supra note 121, at 367.
139. See generally GEORGE LOVELL, THIS IS NOT CIVIL RIGHTS: DISCOVERING RIGHTS
TALK IN 1939 AMERICA (2012) (discussing the practice of using civil rights language when ex-
pressing dissatisfaction with political and social conditions).
140. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
690 [VOL. 56:661
The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?
which centered on jobs and economic rights.141  The Supreme Court
during the New Deal/Great Society Era promoted the elite conception
of civil liberties, protecting free speech, freedom of religion. racial
equality, and the rights of persons suspected of crime, but rarely an-
nouncing rights to economic equality.142 When the Justices did turn to
rights to basic necessities during the late 1960s,143 partisan differences
among the Justices quickly emerged144 and the effort to promote eco-
nomic equality was soon abandoned.145
The pattern of liberal judicial decisions during the middle to late
twentieth century was partly a consequence of liberal elites in govern-
ment preferring federal Justices who shared their elite values.  One
consequence of the elite consensus that formed during the New Deal/
Great Society Era was that Republicans and Democrats in the execu-
tive branch of the national government often employed similar criteria
when making judicial nominations.  Kevin McMahon details how ra-
cial liberals in the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administra-
tions sought to pack the federal judiciary with Justices they believed
were committed to declaring Jim Crow institutions unconstitu-
tional.146  Wiley Rutledge and Robert Jackson, two Democratic ap-
pointees, were appointed in part because they had criticized the
Supreme Court’s decision in Minersville School District v. Gobitis,147
which sustained a state law requiring public school children to salute
141. See generally LOVELL, supra note 139, at 70-106.
142. See generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997) (critiquing the Warren
Court’s rulings on welfare in the context of twentieth-century politics); Mark A. Graber, The
Clintonification of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 731 (1997) (questioning liberal constitutional theorists’ failure to promote equality
in welfare).
143. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (holding that termination of welfare
benefits prior to a fair hearing adversely affected a recipient’s ability to seek redress); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 621 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state statutory provision that
denies welfare assistance to residents of the state who have not resided within their jurisdiction
for at least one year).
144. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (reversing judgment in favor of
welfare recipients on grounds that it is not the Court’s place to “second guess” the difficult
responsibility of state officials to allocate resources).
145. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-56 (1973) (holding that
where wealth was involved, the Equal Protection Clause did not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages).
146. See generally KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE
PRESIDENCY PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004) (arguing that Roosevelt’s administration
played a crucial role in the Supreme Court’s increasing commitment to racial equality).




the flag.148  William Brennan, a Republican appointee, had given sev-
eral speeches attacking McCarthyism before being appointed to the
bench.149  Justices who had known liberal attitudes on some civil liber-
ties issues, unsurprisingly, often had liberal attitudes on many other
civil liberties issues.
More important, the elite consensus of the New Deal/Great Soci-
ety Era meant that the Supreme Court was likely to be dominated by
constitutional liberals as long as presidents did not make self-con-
scious efforts to pack the court with constitutional conservatives.
With the exception of Truman’s tendency to nominate Justices he
thought would sustain anti-Communist legislation,150 no Justice from
1932 to 1968 was nominated to the Supreme Court because either the
President or crucial members of the Justice Department believed that
person had narrow conceptions of free speech, religious freedom, ra-
cial equality, or constitutional criminal procedure.151  Eisenhower, in
particular, had few if any substantive litmus tests for federal judges.152
More often than not, he and other Presidents of the time period
looked to appoint a distinguished jurist, whose opinion on one or two
issues might be ascertained with some reasonable degree of certainty.
The public opinion surveys of the times suggest, however, that as long
as Presidents fished in a pond in which only legal elites swam, they
were likely to have a far more liberal catch than if they picked people
randomly out of the phone book.  In particular, if a potential judge’s
opinion on free speech, race, religion, or constitutional criminal proce-
dure could not be determined on the basis of previous statements, the
odds were high that the jurist shared the same liberal sentiments as
did the vast majority of affluent, educated legal elites.
148. Mark A. Graber, False Modesty: Felix Frankfurter and the Tradition of Judicial Re-
straint, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 29-30 (2007).
149. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Closing Remarks for Symposium on “Justice Brennan and the
Living Constitution,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2217, 2217-18 (2007).
150. See generally DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999) (discussing what happens before the
Senate hearings to show how Presidents go about deciding who will sit on the Supreme Court).
151. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 163-231 (describing the relationship between
the President and the selection of Justices to the Supreme Court); YALOF, supra note 150, at 20-
96 (analyzing the selection criteria and political pressures affecting the decisions made by the
Presidents, from Truman to Reagan).
152. See YALOF, supra note 150, at 42-44.
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IV. ELITE POLARIZATION AND THE LATE
REHNQUIST/ROBERTS COURT
The late Rehnquist and early Roberts Court seem prominent
counterexamples to claims that life tenured Justices protect powerless
minorities, promote elite values or follow the election returns.  Recent
judicial decisions supporting the National Rifle Association’s interpre-
tation of the Second Amendment153 and striking down limits on cor-
porate expenditures154 hardly demonstrate a judicial capacity “to
listen to voices from the margins.”  A Supreme Court majority be-
came sensitive to gay and lesbian voices only after gays and lesbians
achieved substantial success in electoral politics.155  Several studies
demonstrate both Republican and Democratic judicial appointees are
willing to declare laws unconstitutional that were passed by bipartisan
majorities.156  No political party or elite faction champions the mix of
liberal and conservative polices presently championed by the Supreme
Court, a mix that includes constitutional protections for gun owners,
persons sentenced to death or detained during the war against terror-
ism,157 evangelical Christians,158 gays and lesbians, and white college
153. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second
Amendment right is fully applicable to the states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,
594 (2008) (holding the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear
arms).
154. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010).
155. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding the Texas statute that
criminalized intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons was a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a law making it more
difficult for one group to seek aid from the government is a denial of equal protection), with
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (holding that the act of consensual sodomy is not
protected under the fundamental right to privacy or any right protected under the Constitution).
See generally KLARMAN, supra note 24 (discussing the strength of the backlash against gay mar-
riage in spite of its growing support).
156. See Matthew E. K. Hall, Rethinking Regime Politics, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 878, 885-
86 (2012); Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate
Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 321 (2007) (examining when ideologically mixed
coalitions invalidate bipartisan statutes).
157. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was
not intended to result, in death of the victim); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2008)
(holding that aliens detained at Guantanamo have the habeas corpus privilege, and declaring
Section 7 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding the Eighth Amendment
prohibits imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under the age of eighteen);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that due process demands that a citizen
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision maker).
158. See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(holding the University’s denial of financial support to a student organization’s publication pro-
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applicants who claim to be victims of affirmative action.159  In sharp
contrast to the Court during the New Deal/Great Society Era, which
was divided between liberals who wished to exercise judicial power on
behalf of liberal causes and liberals who believed in judicial re-
straint,160 the late Rehnquist/early Roberts Court is divided between a
bloc of Justices who hold more liberal opinions on most constitutional
issues than most Democrats, a bloc of Justices who hold more con-
servative opinions on most constitutional issues than most Republi-
cans, and one or two Justices who hold more idiosyncratic opinions on
the constitutional issues of the day.161  The result is the first court in
American history that consistently engages in both liberal and con-
servative activism.162  Neither life tenure, nor elite status, nor the elec-
tion returns in isolation can explain this development.
Life tenure, elite status, and election returns in combination pro-
vide a clearer window into the path of contemporary constitutional
law.  American politics for the past decades has been structured by
increased elite polarization on almost all salient issues of the day.
One consequence of this polarization is that the legal elites that Dem-
ocrats appoint to the federal bench are highly likely to be more liberal
on most constitutional issues than the average Democratic and the
legal elites that Republicans appoint to the federal bench are highly
likely to be more conservative on most constitutional issues than the
average Republican.  Justices Anthony Kennedy is the only justice
presently on the Supreme Court who does not fit this mould.  Ken-
nedy’s voting pattern resembles that of a country-club Republican, an
elite type that flourished during the 1980s when Kennedy was ap-
pointed, but is rapidly vanishing from the political scene.
Elite Polarization.  The structure of elite opinion has changed
sharply over the past fifty years.  Surveys taken in the mid to late
twentieth century suggested that Republican and Democratic elites on
many issues had more in common with each other than with other
moting religious views was a denial of their right of free speech guaranteed by the First
Amendment).
159. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding use of racial preferences
in undergraduate admissions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
160. See HOWARD GILLMAN ET AL., RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 482 (2012).
161. See id. at 864. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST
COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12 (2005) (describing the political
makeup of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts).
162. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 548-49 (1997).
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members of their party.  Contemporary surveys find that Republican
and Democratic elites now have less in common with each other than
do ordinary Democrats and Republicans.  Much to the frustration of
many ordinary citizens, American politics seems stalemated on many
issues because fewer and fewer elites either hold moderate opinions
or are willing to compromise.
Contemporary public opinion is structured by two phenomena.
The first is elite polarization. Affluent, educated Americans are dis-
proportionately represented among both strong liberals and strong
conservatives, while less affluent and educated citizens are more in-
clined to be political moderates.  Morris Fiorina and Matthew
Levendusky write,
[W]hile systematic evidence indicates that American politics as con-
ducted by the political class is increasingly polarized, the evidence
also suggests that this development is not simply a reflection of an
increasingly polarized electorate.  The result is a disconnect be-
tween the American people and those who purport to represent
them . . . . Contrary to a half-century of theory and research on the
centrist tendencies of two-party politics, American politics today
finds a polarized political class competing for the support of a much
less polarized electorate.163
The second phenomenon is conflict extension.  Geoffrey Layman and
Thomas Carey describe “conflict extension” as “a growth in mass
party polarization on multiple distinct issue dimensions.”  Party elites,
they point out, are not simply more liberal or conservative in general
than ordinary citizens, they are “more polarized on social welfare, ra-
cial, and cultural issues.”164  An affluent, educated Democrat is likely
to be more liberal than the average Democrat on health care, affirma-
tive action, and same-sex marriage.  An affluent, educated Republican
is likely to be more conservative than the average Republican on each
of these issues.  On almost all issues, elite Democrats take the liberal
position and elite Republicans take the conservative position.
Two studies done by the Pew Research Group highlight the pres-
ence of elite polarization and conflict extension in American politics.
163. Morris P. Fiorina & Matthew S. Levendusky, Disconnected: The Political Class Versus
the People, in RED AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S PO-
LARIZED POLITICS 49, 51-52 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2002).
164. Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Party Polarization and “Conflict Extension”
in the American Electorate, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 786, 789 (2002).
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The first survey was published in 2005.165  The second was published
in 2011.166  Each survey offered a typology of American voters.  Each
survey detailed how, over time, strong conservatives had become
more conservative on more issues and strong liberals had become
more liberal on more issues.  The most extreme typologies, both stud-
ies found, were disproportionately composed of affluent, educated
Americans.
The Pew Research Group in 2005 observed that previous differ-
ences among strong political conservatives had largely vanished.
Surveys in 1987 and 1994 documented the existence of two distinctive
conservative groups: “Enterprisers,” who held strong conservative
views on economic issues, and “Moralists,” who held strong conserva-
tive views on cultural issues.167  By 2005, “Enterprisers” had adopted
the cultural positions of “Moralists.”  The group Pew now labeled as
“Enterprisers” was characterized by strong conservative values across
the political spectrum.  The Pew study declared,
[T]his extremely partisan Republican group’s politics are driven by
a belief in the free enterprise system and social values that reflect a
conservative agenda.  Enterprisers are also the strongest backers of
an assertive foreign policy, which includes nearly unanimous sup-
port for the war in Iraq and strong support for such anti-terrorism
efforts as the Patriot Act.168
The defining values of Enterprisers were “anti-regulation and pro-
business; very little support for government help to the poor; strong
belief that individuals are responsible for their own well being[,]” and
“[c]onservative on social issues such as gay marriage . . . .”169
Liberals were the exact opposite of Enterprisers. Pew found,
“[liberals] are the most opposed to an assertive foreign policy, the
most secular, and take the most liberal views on social issues such as
homosexuality, abortion, and censorship.  They differ from other
Democratic groups in that they are strongly pro-environmental and
165. The 2005 Political Typology, PEW RES. CENTER, 1 (May 10, 2005), http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/242.pdf [hereinafter PEW 2005].
166. Beyond Red vs. Blue: Political Typology, PEW RES. CENTER, 1, 4 (May 4, 2011), http://
www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Beyond-Red-vs-Blue-The-Political-Typology.pdf [herein-
after PEW 2011].
167. See PEW 2005, supra note 165, at 8.
168. Id. at 53.
169. Id.
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pro-immigration.”170  Liberals were “pro-choice,” “supportive of gay
marriage,” and “most opposed to the anti-terrorism Patriot Act.”171
Enterprisers and Liberals were by a significant margin the most
educated and most affluent of the nine typologies Pew identified in
2005.172  Twenty-seven percent of the persons Pew surveyed had grad-
uated college, but 46% of all Enterprisers and 49% of all Liberals had
a college degree.173  Only one other typology (Upbeats—37%) was
composed of more than one-third college graduates and only one
other typology (Social Conservatives—28%) was composed of more
than one-quarter college graduates.174  The pattern was almost as
stark with respect to income.175  Twenty-four percent of the persons
Pew surveyed had family incomes above $75,000, but 41% of both
Enterprisers and Liberals earned that income.176  Upbeats (39%)
were almost as affluent as Enterprisers and Liberals.177  Outside of
Social Conservatives (30%), no other group identified had as many as
one-sixth of all persons surveyed earning $75,000.178
On almost every issue surveyed, the greatest percentage of re-
spondents taking the most conservative position were from the most
affluent and highly educated group of Republicans and the greatest
percentage of respondents taking the most liberal position were from
the most affluent and highly educated group of Democrats.179  This
was particularly the case with issues that were being litigated.  Enter-
prisers were far more likely to oppose (63%) and liberals most likely
to support (82%) “programs designed to help blacks, women and
other minorities get better jobs and education.”180  Liberals were the
group most likely to support legal abortion (88%) and same-sex mar-
riage (80%).181  Enterprisers were the group most likely to oppose
both (54% on abortion; 90% on same-sex marriage).182  Enterprisers
(and Pro-Government Conservatives) were most likely to support
teaching creationism in public schools.  Liberals were the group most
170. Id. at 58.
171. Id.
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opposed.183  Enterprisers and Disaffecteds were the group that most
favored torturing terrorists for information.184  Liberals were the
group most opposed.185
The 2011 Pew survey complicated this story a bit (in part by not
asking the same questions that were asked in 2005).  The divides be-
tween different groups that tended to support Democrats remained
the same.  Members of the most affluent well educated group of Dem-
ocrats tended to be far more liberal on all issues than members of
other Democratic groups.  Most Republicans, elite or otherwise, had
become conservative across the board, at least on the issues most
likely to come before the Supreme Court.  Two new groups of highly
educated, affluent Americans emerged: Post-Moderns and Libertari-
ans.  While Pew placed these groups in the center of their political
typology, because members weaker tendencies to vote for either
Democrats (Post-Moderns) or Republicans (Upbeats) than members
of more partisan groups.  Post-Moderns and Libertarians tended to
take more extreme positions on the sorts of issues likely to come
before federal courts than both members of less affluent and less well
educated groups and members of other, more centrist groups.
Solid Liberals were the most highly educated group that Pew sur-
veyed in 2011 and the most affluent of any group that had any ten-
dency to support Democrats.186 With very rare exception, Solid
Liberals were more liberal on every issue likely to come before fed-
eral courts than any other Democratic group or Democrat leaning
group.187  Eighty-five percent of Solid Liberals supported gay mar-
riage, as compared to 32% of Hard Pressed Democrats and 34% of
New Coalition Democrats.188  The difference between Solid Liberals
and these other Democratic groups was only slightly less with respect
to legal abortion.189  Solid Liberals were more likely than any other
group to favor liberal immigration laws, support health care reform,
maintain that racial discrimination is the main barrier to Afro-Ameri-
can progress, and insist that government must do more to “give blacks
equal rights with whites.”190  They and New Coalition Democrats
183. Id. at 71.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 105.
187. See id. at 99-100, 111.
188. Id. at 111.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 99-100, 111.
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were far more likely than Hard-Pressed Democrats to support gun
control.191  Solid Liberals closely resemble other Democratic groups
only in their view of labor unions.  Members of all three Demo-
cratic groups had by a three-to-one margin of favorable views of that
institution.192
Matters were less clear on the Republican side. The most con-
servative group, Staunch Conservatives, were only slightly better edu-
cated and affluent than the other solidly Republican group, Main
Street Republicans.193  One reason for this change from 2005 was that,
unlike Democrats, who remain divided into distinctive ideological
groups, most Republicans have become conservative on all important
issues.  The Pew researchers noted, “the classic division between eco-
nomic and social conservatives is blurred,” as members of the previ-
ously more affluent and less affluent groups “have coalesced into a
single highly activated group of Staunch Conservatives.”194  Neverthe-
less, the slightly more educated and slightly more affluent Republican
group remains the most conservative of the two solidly Republican
groups in the country on all issues likely to come before courts.195
Staunch Conservatives are more likely than Main Street Republicans
to oppose the Obama health care plan (80%-47%), oppose gay mar-
riage (85% – 72%), oppose legal abortion (72% – 64%) and favor gun
rights (86% – 64%).196  With the exception of abortion, only a minis-
cule number of Staunch Conservatives actually favor liberal policies
on any of these issues (none of the Staunch Conservatives Pew sur-
veyed thought health care reform had “mostly good effects”).197  In-
terestingly, Staunch Conservatives are moderates on First
Amendment issues.198  This may reflect the increasing tendency of
government officials to restrict campaign finance, commercial speech,
and hate speech, measures that limit conservative advocacy, rather
than more traditional restrictions on communism and obscenity.199
The years between 2005 and 2011 witnessed the emergence of
two relatively affluent and educated groups of independents.  Post-
191. Id. at 111.
192. Id. at 108.
193. Id. at 1, 105.
194. Id. at 20.
195. See id. at 109, 111.
196. Id. at 111.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 88.
199. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 396 (1990).
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Moderns, who leaned Democratic, were the second most educated
group surveyed and almost as affluent as Solid Liberals.  Libertarians,
who leaned Republican, were the most affluent group surveyed and
slightly more educated than Staunch Conservatives.200  Post-Moderns
and Libertarians also resembled Solid Liberals and Staunch Conserva-
tives because members of these groups are more united than members
of other groups on virtually all civil liberties issues.201  On some issues,
most notably those associated with racial politics, Libertarians and
Post-Moderns, by comparison, were far more united in favor of con-
servative positions, than any group other than Staunch Conserva-
tives.202  On other matters, Libertarians and Post-Moderns were only
less liberal than Staunch Liberals.  Post-Moderns were the second
most liberal group on censorship, gay marriage, abortion, and envi-
ronmental issues.203  Libertarians were the third most liberal group on
these issues.204  Libertarians were the second most conservative group
on gun rights, labor unions, the merits of big versus small government,
and the environment.205  Post-Moderns were the only group composed
of a substantially number of affluent, well educated citizens who had
any tendency to be one of the three (of nine) centrist groups on any
number of issues that Pew surveyed.206
Members of the most affluent and highly educated of the groups
Pew surveyed were also the most united on the proper method of con-
stitutional interpretation.207 Solid Liberals (81%) and Post-Moderns
(70%) were the only two groups whose members by substantial mar-
gins endorsed a living Constitution.208  Staunch Conservatives (88%)
and Libertarians (70%) were the two groups that most strongly fa-
vored originalism.209  With the exception of Main Street Republicans
(64% favored originalism), members of other groups were far more
divided on questions of constitutional interpretation.210  This finding
200. PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 105.
201. Id. at 108-11.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 111.
204. Id. at 108-09, 111.
205. Id.  Similar differences appeared on foreign policy issues unlikely to come before courts.
Post-Moderns were the second most liberal group when asked if peace was better achieved
through diplomacy or military strength.  Libertarians were the second most conservative. See id.
at 100.
206. Id. at 108-11.





The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo?
suggests that, a President who nominated a Democrat with a law de-
gree for a federal judgeship was highly likely to place on the bench a
Justice who shared William Brennan’s approach to constitutional ad-
judication.211  Similarly, a President who nominated a Republican
with a law degree was highly likely to place on the bench a Justice who
shared Justice Antonin Scalia’s approach to constitutional
adjudication.212
The Late Rehnquist/Early Roberts Courts.  The changes in the
structure of elite opinion over the past fifty years help explain the
different divisions on the Warren Court and the late Rehnquist/early
Roberts Courts.  During the mid-twentieth century, Democratic and
Republican legal elites both tended to have liberal opinions on the
major constitutional issues being adjudicated before federal courts.
Hence, the major divide on the court in that time period was between
liberal proponents of judicial activism and liberal proponents of judi-
cial restraint.  During the early twenty-first century, most Democratic
legal elites are Solid Liberals who take very liberal positions on almost
every issue being adjudicated by federal courts and most Republican
legal elites are Staunch Conservatives who take very conservative po-
sitions on almost every issue being adjudicated by federal courts.
Hence, the major divide on the contemporary court is between Demo-
cratic appointees who are more liberal than the average Democrat
and Republican appointees who are more conservative than the aver-
age Republican.
The contentious politics of judicial confirmation213 may contrib-
ute to polarization on the Supreme Court.  Contemporary Presidents
often search for “stealth nominees,” whose opinions on many consti-
tutional issues are not well known, in order to avoid confirmation bat-
tles in the Senate.214 Republican Presidents who adopt that strategy
can be expected to select Enterprisers or Staunch Conservatives,
given most affluent, educated Republican legal elites fall into those
political typologies.  Such judges are likely to be originalists who take
211. See William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratifica-
tion, 43 GUILD PRAC. 1, 2-3 (1986) (describing Brennan’s approach to interpreting the
Constitution).
212. See Scalia, supra note 28, at 856-57.
213. See generally MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES: THE NEW POLITICS OF SU-
PREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS (1994) (describing the evolving politics of judicial
confirmations).
214. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, SUP. CT. REV.,
2010, at 381, 438.
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conservative views on almost all issues coming before the court, with
the possible exception of some free speech matters.  Democratic Pres-
idents who adopt this strategy can be expected to select Liberals or
Solid Liberals, given that most affluent, educated Democratic legal
elites fall into those political typologies.  Such judges are likely to be
living constitutionalists who take liberal views on almost all issues
coming before the court, with the possible exception of matters con-
cerning labor unions.  Republican “mistakes” are likely to be Liber-
tarians, the other affluent, educated group whose members tend to
vote Republican.  Such judges will likely turn out to be originalists
who vote with the conservatives on the bench except on matters of
morality, immigration, and some issues of religion.  Democratic “mis-
takes” are likely to be Post-Moderns, the other affluent educated
group whose members tend to vote democratic.  Such a judge will
likely turn out to be a living constitutionalists who votes with the lib-
erals on the bench, except on some racial issues and questions of na-
tional power.
The voting patterns on the late Rehnquist and early Roberts
Courts are consistent with the patterns that would probably have re-
sulted had Presidents, instead of vetting judicial appointees at great
length, simply selected almost at random an elite lawyer who was a
member of their party.  Chief Justice Roberts, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito vote as Enter-
prisers/Staunch Conservatives.  They are originalists who consistently
take conservative positions on matters ranging from the role of relig-
ion in public life to the scope of national power.  When these Justices
cast liberal votes, the case before the court is likely to concern matters
such as immigration on which Libertarians tend to have more liberal
opinions than Enterprisers/Staunch Conservatives.215  Justice Gins-
burg, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Breyer vote as
Liberals/Solid Liberals.  They are living constitutionalists who consist-
ently take liberal positions on matters ranging from capital punish-
ment to the war against terror.  When these Justices cast conservative
votes, the case before the court is likely to concern matters such as
race and national power, on which Post-Moderns have more conserva-
tive opinions than Liberals/Solid Liberals.216
215. See generally Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2497, 2510 (2012) (striking down
crucial state restrictions in Arizona on illegal immigrants).
216. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602, 2609 (2012) (declaring
that part of the Affordable Care Act violated the Spending Clause).
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Justice Kennedy might be characterized as a libertarian, given his
tendency to vote with liberals on some First Amendment issues217 and
privacy matters, but he and Justice O’Connor are better placed in a
previously existing category of Republican elites.218  Kennedy and
O’Connor were appointed at a time when many Republican elites
were best described as “country-club conservatives.”  Mark Tushnet
points out that such affluent, educated Republicans were “sympa-
thetic to claims about reproductive and gay rights and are opposed to
what they see as the intrusion of religion into the public schools.”219
Country-club Republicans were also not as hostile to national power
as those contemporary Staunch Republicans who often support the
Tea Party.220
The divisions on the contemporary Supreme Court mirror these
divisions among contemporary American elites.  Public opinion
surveys find that educated, affluent Democrats are far more likely
than other Democrats to take liberal positions on all the major consti-
tutional issues of the day and that educated, affluent Republicans are
far more likely than other Republicans to take conservative positions
on all the major constitutional issues of the day.  Whether the issue
concerns state sovereign immunity or school vouchers, on all matters
in which the late Rehnquist and early Roberts Courts were divided,
the most recent Democratic appointees took the more liberal position
(joined by two liberal Republicans) and the most recent Republican
appointees took the more conservative position.  Moreover, the lib-
eral and conservative blocs on the present Court seem more liberal
and conservative than the average Democrat and average Republican.
Consider abortion.  Most Americans believe that abortion should be
legal, but heavily regulated.221  The political elites who control the Re-
publican Party believe that abortion should be banned, while the elites
who control the Democratic Party oppose almost all common restric-
tions on abortion.222  Following in this vein, the Staunch Conservative
on the contemporary court have never voted to strike down a restric-
217. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 579-80, 599 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
398-99 (1989).
218. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
219. Mark Tushnet, Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 31 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 197, 198
(2005).
220. See PEW 2011, supra note 166, at 10.
221. See H.W. Perry, Jr., & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 641, 675 (2009).
222. Id. at 670-78.
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tion on abortion and the Solid Liberals have never voted to sustain a
restriction.223  Justice Kennedy is the only member of the present Su-
preme Court who has voted to sustain and voting to strike down dif-
ferent abortion regulations.224
Electoral returns provide a less helpful guide to the direction of
Supreme Court decision making during times of elite polarization,
conflict extension and electoral volatility.  Most Supreme Court Jus-
tices in these circumstances are likely to be relatively extreme liberal
Democrats or relatively extreme conservative Republicans.  When
Republicans and Democrats alternate in power, the precise balance of
power on the federal judiciary depends on the accidents of death,
whether Justices retire strategically, and the voting pattern of the in-
creasingly rare justice who is neither a Solid Liberal nor a Staunch
Conservative.  Consider the very different pattern of decisions that
might have resulted had Justice Marshall retired during the Carter
presidency and that liberal Democrat judicial appointee left office
during President Obama’s first term of office.  The only prediction
that can be made with some certainty is, if Americans continue to live
in times of elite polarization, conflict extension, and electoral volatil-
ity, constitutional law is likely to be become less stable than at any
previous point in American history.
V. THE COMING CONSTITUTIONAL YO-YO
Elite polarization, conflict extension, and electoral volatility
threaten several enduring stabilities in American constitutional law.
American constitutional law for more than two-hundred years has
been structured by incremental change, relative issue autonomy, and
the relative endurance of landmark decisions.  These stabilities, in
turn, are consequences of either relative electoral stability or, during
periods of electoral volatility, elite consensus.  Americans have never
experienced an extended period when elites are polarized and parties
alternate in control of the national government.  Should these trends
continue, the likely result is an erratic constitutional law that swings
from one relative extreme on many issues to the other.
American constitutional law has historically tended to change in-
crementally.  While Supreme Court decisions inevitably make at least
some changes to the existing body of constitutional law, most deci-
223. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
224. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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sions do little more than slightly extend or modify existing doctrine.
The constitutional law landscape is littered with far more decisions
resembling United States v. Jones,225 which relied heavily on the com-
mon law of trespass when declaring that police need a warrant when
attaching a GPS system to a private car, than Mapp v. Ohio,226 which
upset longstanding prosecutorial practices when holding that the
Fourth Amendment as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required states to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence from criminal trials.  Judicial decisions overruling
past cases are rare.  Judicial decisions overruling landmark cases are
rarer still.227
Different areas of constitutional law are often relatively autono-
mous from each other, characterized by what Karen Orren and Ste-
phen Skowronek describe as “intercurrence.”228  Orren and
Skowronek maintain that “the normal condition of the policy [is] that
of multiple incongruous authorities operating simultaneously.”229
Constitutional doctrine on different subject matters, like “the institu-
tions of a polity . . . are created . . . at different times, in the light of
different experiences, and often for quite contrary purposes.”230  In-
stabilities in one area of constitutional law often have limited impact
on other areas of constitutional law.  The 1930s and 1940s witnessed
dramatic changes in the constitutional law of national powers231 and
property rights,232 but no changes in the constitutional law of capital
punishment233 or the right to bear arms.234  The “revolutionary” War-
ren Court did not challenge previous understandings of property
225. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
226. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
227. See generally LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECI-
SIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS (5th ed. 2011) (providing a comprehensive collection of data and
information on the U.S. Supreme Court).
228. KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DE-
VELOPMENT 108 (2004).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 112.
231. See generally Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the federal govern-
ment can regulate economic activity); United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941)
(holding that the federal government can regulate employment conditions).
232. See generally West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of a state’s minimum wage legislation).
233. See generally Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (holding that
capital punishment does not violate the Constitution).
234. See generally Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435 (1935) (holding that a provision of




rights235 or gender equality236 and had almost nothing to say on the
constitutional law of separation of powers.237
Both secular trends in constitutional law doctrine and landmark
judicial decisions tend to have fairly long staying power.  Once the
Justices begin to expand or narrow particular constitutional rights, the
course of judicial decisions tends to go in the same direction for sev-
eral generations.  The Supreme Court from the end of Reconstruction
until the early twentieth century repeatedly chipped away at the con-
stitutional foundations of racial equality.238  After Guinn v. United
States,239 the Justices for the next fifty years consistently made deci-
sions that expanded constitutional protections for people of color.240
With the notable exception of Hepburn v. Griswold,241 which was
overruled almost immediately,242 the relatively rare judicial decision
that dramatically alters existing doctrine proves relatively enduring.
Landmark constitutional law cases are often modified or narrowed,
but rarely overruled. Liberals regularly accuse conservatives of under-
mining the spirit of such decisions as Mapp v. Ohio,243 Miranda v.
Arizona,244 and Roe v. Wade,245 but those decisions, as well as every
other landmark liberal decision of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, remain
standing today.246
The dynamics of partisan competition in the United States
throughout much of American history supported these stabilities.  Po-
litical scientists point out that American politics has historically been
235. See generally Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding a statute criminalizing
“debt adjusting”).
236. See generally Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a jury selection statute that
mandated men, and not women, to serve as jurors).
237. Leading textbooks in law and political science include no case on separation of powers
decided when Earl Warren was Chief Justice. See, e.g., GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 490-
512; KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 249-347 (17th ed.
2010).
238. See, e.g., Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
239. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
240. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
241. 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
242. See Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1871).
243. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). But see Leon v. United States, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment).
244. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that
Miranda warnings are not constitutionally protected).
245. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). But see Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989)
(upholding a state statute that restricted various types of assistance to receiving an abortion).
246. For an admittedly outdated work on this point, see generally THE BURGER COURT: THE
COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
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characterized by long periods of relative partisan stability during
which one party, Jeffersonian Republicans, Jacksonian Democrats,
Reconstruction Republicans, or New Deal Democrats, controls most
national institutions most of the time.247  Either judicial doctrine is
stable during those time periods or the course of judicial decisions is
consistent because most Justices share whatever constitutional vision
animates the dominant party. Constitutional doctrine from Recon-
struction until the Civil War reflected the pro-business orientation of
the dominant Republican Party.248  The Supreme Court after the New
Deal provided increasing support for persons of color at the same
time that liberals in other national institutions provided increased sup-
port for persons of color.249
The structure of elite opinion throughout much of American his-
tory has also supported the incremental nature of most changes in
constitutional law, the relative autonomy of different issue areas, and
the relative durability of landmark cases.  Elite consensus has often
been the norm in American constitutional politics.  From the very be-
ginning of the Republic, elites often had more in common with each
other than they did with the mass base of their parties, and this elite
consensus provided foundations for a more stable constitutional law.
Thomas Jefferson when seeking to make his first judicial appointment
found that all qualified Jeffersonian lawyers in the deep south had
strong ties to commercial establishments.  Jefferson and Madison
tended to appoint moderate national Republicans to the Supreme
Court because educated affluent Jeffersonian lawyers were far more
likely to be moderates who were supportive of the general trends of
the Marshall Court than the average Jeffersonian voter.250  For this
reason, the transition from Federalist to Jeffersonian rule had less in-
fluence on the Supreme Court than other governing institutions.251
When elite polarization occurred, the lack of conflict extension pre-
served the relative autonomy of most matters of constitutional law.
During the years before the Civil War, Southern affluent educated
lawyers held very different opinions on slavery than Northern affluent
247. See generally JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT
AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1983).
248. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 319-326.
249. See KLARMAN, supra note 65, at 173-96.
250. See generally RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971).
251. See generally Mark A. Graber, Federalist or Friends of Adams: The Marshall Court and
Party Politics, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 229, 242 (1998).
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educated lawyers. Dred Scott,252 which held that Congress could not
ban slavery in American territories, was one consequence of these sec-
tional differences.  Nevertheless, elite polarization on slavery was con-
tained.  The judicial majority in Dred Scott included Peter Daniel, the
Justice who held the narrowest conception of national power to regu-
late the economy,253 and James Wayne, the Justice who held the
broadest conception of national power to regulate the economy.254
Antebellum judicial alignments in slavery cases were different from
judicial alignments in Contract Clause and dormant Commerce
Clause cases, the two other constitutional issues frequently litigated
before the Supreme Court in Jacksonian America.  The Justices in the
Dred Scott majority, for example, divided 3-2 when considering the
state power to tax passengers on ships arriving from out of state.255
The absence of conflict extension helps explain why a court that took
southern positions on slavery issues adopted fairly centrist positions
on the other constitutional issues of the day and did not break dramat-
ically from previous precedent on these matters.256
Elite consensus explains the stability of American constitutional
law during the late nineteenth century, the most electorally volatile
period in American history.  From 1880 to 1900, the parties rotated
control over national executive and more than one-hundred seat sw-
ings in Congress were common.  Nevertheless, most areas of constitu-
tional law remained either unchanged or moved in a steady
conservative direction.257  Constitutional law exhibited almost none of
the instabilities of electoral politics because the elite wings of both the
Democratic and Republican Parties was located in the northeast and
was committed to a pro-business constitutional vision.258  The con-
servative Democrats that Grover Cleveland appointed to the Supreme
Court differed little from the conservative Republicans that James
Garfield, Chester Arthur, and Benjamin Harrison appointed to the
252. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
253. See, e.g., Seawright v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 180-81 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting) (denying
national power to build roads).
254. See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 410-11 (1849) (“The commerce power is] exclu-
sively vested in Congress, [and] that no part of it can be exercised by a State.”).
255. Justices Wayne, Catron, and Grieg thought the state tax unconstitutional.  Chief Justice
Taney and Justice Daniel disagreed. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
256. See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1952); Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio
v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369 (1853). See generally MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 56-59.
257. See MCCLOSKEY, supra note 20, at 80-90.
258. See GILLMAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 322.
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Supreme Court.259  In Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.,260 the
only major constitutional case in that era in which the Justices divided
5-4, the majority in favor of striking down the national income tax was
composed of three Republican appointees and two Democrat appoin-
tees.  Three Republican appointees and one Democratic appointee
dissented.
The Reagan Era provides another illustration of the structure of
elite opinion stabilizing constitutional law.  Reagan and his conserva-
tive allies sought to push American constitutional law sharply to the
right.261  Democrats after 1986, however, had the necessary votes to
prevent Reagan from placing on the Supreme Court any Justice on
record as favoring a substantial conservative judicial turn.  Stymied by
failed efforts to place such conservatives as Robert Bork on the
bench, Republicans in the executive branch turned to “stealth” nomi-
nees, affluent, educated Republican lawyers who had not expressed
firm opinions on most constitutional issues of the day.262  During the
late twentieth century, an affluent, educated Republican lawyer whose
constitutional opinions were not yet public was at least as likely to fit
the mold of a “country-club Republican,” as what the Pew Foundation
presently considers a Staunch Conservative.  Thus, the end result of
the stealth nominee strategy was a moderate with little interest in
moving constitutional law to the right (Souter), a libertarian/moderate
conservative interested in moving only some constitutional doctrines
to the right (Kennedy), and a more doctrinaire conservative
(Thomas).  The Reagan judicial strategy failed in large part because
the structure of elite opinion combined with the politics of judicial
confirmation privileged the selection of Republicans more interested
in stable constitutional law than a significantly more conservative con-
stitutional law.
These foundations for a stable constitutional law have crumbled.
Electoral volatility destabilizes constitutional law because Justices,
when control of the institutions responsible for staffing the federal ju-
diciary alternates, are frequently unlikely to share a common partisan
constitutional vision.  Elite polarization destabilizes constitutional law
259. See ABRAHAM, supra note 57, at 109-21.
260. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
261. See generally YALOF, supra note 150, at 133 (“Reagan’s Pursuit of Conservative
Ideologies”).
262. See Richard S. Myers, Reviews, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 619, 619 (1992) (reviewing MARK
GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF
ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992)).
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because Justices, when the affluent educated lawyers most likely to
staff the federal bench are either more conservative then the average
member of the more conservative party or more liberal than the aver-
age member of the more liberal party, are unlikely to share a common
elite constitutional vision.  The combination of electoral volatility and
elite polarization, we have seen, is a recipe for a Supreme Court
whose two largest blocs are Staunch Conservatives whose opinions are
to the right of the average Republican and Solid Liberals whose opin-
ions are to the left of the average Democrat.
Conflict extension further destabilizes American constitutional
law.  For much of the twentieth century, the relative autonomy of con-
stitutional issues insulated most constitutional doctrines from substan-
tial changes in other constitutional doctrines.  Roosevelt’s judicial
appointees were as united as other New Deal liberals on the principle
that Justices should not interfere with economic legislation,263 but the
Supreme Court until 1954 did not move dramatically to the left on
civil rights and civil liberties issues because the liberals Roosevelt ap-
pointed to the Court were as divided on the merits of judicial protec-
tion for free speech rights and the rights of persons suspected of crime
as other New Deal liberals.264  While on the Court, for example, Jus-
tice Frankfurter destabilized Commerce Clause doctrine, but helped
temporarily stabilize doctrine on the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights.265  By comparison, should President Obama appoint a liberal
to the supreme bench solely for the purpose of providing greater sup-
port for health care legislation, he is highly likely to appoint a Solid
Liberal who also favors the liberal position on same-sex marriage, af-
firmative action, and government power to regulate guns.  Similarly,
should the next Republican President appoint a conservative to the
bench solely for the purpose of maintaining the right to bear arms, he
or she is likely to appoint a Staunch Conservative who favors the con-
servative position on federal health care legislation, same-sex mar-
riage and affirmative action.  In short, unlike New Deal Justices and
other jurists appointed to the Supreme Court during times of conflict
263. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
264. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947).  For a general discussion of liberal divisions on free speech and other civil liberties
issues, see generally MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEG-
ACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FE-
LIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA (1989).
265. See cases cited supra note 231.
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diffusion, judicial appointments in times of conflict extension are
likely to want to move almost all of constitutional law in the same
ideological direction.
Should Americans continue to live in a political environment
structured by electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict exten-
sion, constitutional precedents are likely to be overturned at unprece-
dented rates.  Consider the numerous areas of constitutional law that
a liberal Justice appointed by President Obama to replace a conserva-
tive Justice would destabilize.  Among the decisions that the new 5-4
liberal majority on the Supreme Court would likely consider ripe for
reversal are past rulings finding regulatory takings, permitting ostensi-
ble neutral state aid to flow to parochial schools,266 finding an individ-
ual right to bear arms protected by the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments,267 striking down campaign finance regulations,268 im-
posing Commerce Clause and state sovereign immunity restrictions
against the federal government,269 and declaring unconstitutional
some self-conscious uses of race for purposes of diversity when as-
signing pupils to public schools.270  The replacement of a liberal Jus-
tice with a conservative would be as destabilizing.  Should a
Republican President have the opportunity to replace one of the four
members of the liberal bloc on the Roberts Court, the decisions ripe
for reversal include past rulings finding a public use when government
transfers property from one private owner to another private
owner,271 declaring unconstitutional school prayer exercises,272 strik-
ing down state restrictions on abortion and gay rights,273 protecting
detainees in Guantanamo Bay,274 limiting state capacity to inflict capi-
tal punishment,275 justifying the Affordable Care Act as a legitimate
exercise of the federal taxing power,276 and sustaining affirmative ac-
tion policies.277 Seventeen of the twenty-two Supreme Court cases de-
266. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
267. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008).
268. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
269. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
270. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
271. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
272. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
273. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
274. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
275. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
276. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ___ (2012).
277. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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cided on constitutional grounds that were included in the chapter on
the contemporary era in our casebook dedicated to civil liberties are
highly vulnerable to reversal in the immediate future.278
Given the precarious balance on the federal bench and in electo-
ral politics, the following constitutional yo-yo is not an unrealistic pre-
diction.  President Obama replaces Justice Kennedy with a Solid
Liberal, whose voting pattern on the Court is similar to that of Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor.  The result is huge swaths of constitutional
doctrine turn left.  Public opinion, however, shifts a bit.  The result is
that a Republican wins the 2016 presidential election and, a year later,
replaces Justice Breyer with a Staunch Conservative.  The new 5-4
conservative majority turns huge swaths of constitutional doctrine
rightward.  Public opinion, however, shifts a bit to the left, and you
can see how the rest of this story is going.  The course of constitutional
law becomes erratic, with minor changes in public opinion resulting in
substantial shifts in constitutional doctrine.
Changes in elite opinion make less likely the appointment of a
“stealth justice” who turns out either to have more centrist opinions
or less ideological consistency across issues than either Solid Liberals
or Staunch Conservatives.  As recently as thirty years ago, many elite
Republican lawyers were either traditionalists who held moderate/
center-right views on many constitutional issues or libertarians who
leaned to the left on some constitutional issues and to the right on
others.  Hence, when Democrats had the political power in the Senate
to defeat such known Staunch Conservatives as Robert Bork, the Re-
publican strategy of appointing an elite Republican lawyer was as
likely to result in the moderate David Souter or libertarian Anthony
Kennedy as the very conservative Clarence Thomas.  The vast major-
ity of elite lawyers in both parties now consistently hold more liberal
or more conservative views on almost all issues than the average
Democrat or Republican.  Hence, stealth candidates in the future are
more likely to be Solid Liberals or Staunch Conservatives who kept
their proclivities private than Justices who might moderate the im-
pending constitutional yo-yo.
278. See generally 2 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: RIGHTS & LIBERTIES 881-1053 (2012).
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VI. TOO UNSETTLING?
If the above analysis is correct, American constitutional politics
in conditions of electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict ex-
tension will witness severe and destabilizing doctrinal swings.  This
likely erratic course of constitutional law undermines values champi-
oned by proponents of constitutional settlements and constitutional
unsettlements.  Neither majoritarian nor distinctively constitutional
values are promoted by constitutional doctrine that swings from ex-
treme conservatism to extreme liberalism in short periods of time.
Americans are likely to avert these constitutional yo-yos only if they
enter a new period of electoral stability, elite consensus, or conflict
diffusion.  Alternatively, Supreme Court Justices might discover the
temporary virtues of judicial minimalism.  These saving alternatives
require much strong sociological, jurisprudential, and normative foun-
dations for the constitutional center than presently exist in the United
States.
The Disease.  The constitutional yo-yos threatened by the lethal
combination of electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict ex-
tension will destabilize constitutional law more than even opponents
of constitutional settlements stomach.  These constitutional commen-
tators insist that constitutional authority and judicial power be exer-
cised in ways that keep certain fundamental regime questions
unsettled.279  Keeping constitutional question open, in their view, fa-
cilitates constitutional adjustments in light of changing public opinion,
political trends, or social conditions.  Constitutional yo-yos, however,
are far more sensitive to small, transient changes in public opinion,
political trends, or social conditions than any unsettlement theorist
thinks advisable.  Americans living in a regime where constitutional
law swings wildly in different ideological directions enjoy neither the
benefits promised by proponents nor opponents of constitutional
settlements.280
American constitutional commentators are engaging in a vigor-
ous debate over the merits of a stable constitutional law.  Larry Alex-
ander and Frederick Schauer urge their fellow citizens to adopt
institutional arrangements that minimize substantial changes in consti-
279. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DE-
FENSE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001).
280. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002).
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tutional doctrine.  They maintain that “the settlement of contested is-
sues is a crucial component of constitutionalism” and that “this goal
can be achieved only by having an authoritative interpreter whose in-
terpretations bind all others, and [that] the Supreme Court can best
serve this role.”281  Louis Seidman is the leading champion of prac-
tices that keep constitutional doctrine unsettled.  “An unsettled con-
stitution,” he writes, “helps build a community founded on consent by
enticing losers into a continuing conversation.”282
Electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict extension
destabilize the constitutional regime, but do so in ways that do not
promote the claimed virtues of an unsettled constitutional law.  Seid-
man champions a flexible Constitution that responds appropriately to
political and social developments.  He asserts that “stability and pre-
dictability are best served by gradual shifts in constitutional obligation
rather than by either rigid entrenchment or its inevitable partner, con-
vulsive regime change.”283  An unsettled constitutional law when pub-
lic opinion on capital punishment moves slightly to the left would also
shift slightly to the left, perhaps as a consequence of judicial rulings
requiring better legal representation for capitally sentenced prisoners
and slightly increasing the categories of crimes and criminals not eligi-
ble for execution.  Such relatively precise adjustments do not occur
when constitutional politics is more polarized than the political com-
munity.  In a constitutional universe divided between liberal Justices
who believe capital punishment is always unconstitutional and con-
servative Justices who believe capital punishment is no different than
any other sanction, small changes in public opinion either have no ef-
fect or an effect far beyond their scope.  If a slight swing in public
opinion causes no change in the ideological composition of the federal
judiciary, capital punishment law remains the same.  If a slight swing
in public opinion causes a slight change in the ideological composition
of the federal judiciary, then either the federal judiciary with a new 5-
4 Solid Liberal majority declares capital punishment unconstitutional
or the federal judiciary with a new 5-4 Staunch Conservative majority
overrules almost every case imposing constitutional limits on state and
federal efforts to impose the death penalty.
Small shifts in voting behavior in a society wracked by elite polar-
ization and conflict extension cause dramatic shifts in almost every
281. Alexander & Schauer, supra note 280, at 1359.
282. Seidman, supra note 279, at 8-9.
283. Id. at 47.
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constitutional doctrine, even when no change in public opinion has
taken place on the vast majority of constitutional issues.  Imagine the
Obama Administration is blamed by some segment of the country for
mishandling a foreign policy crisis and the Republican candidate rides
these international concerns to the presidency in the 2016 national
election.  In 2017, that newly elected President replaces Justice Ken-
nedy with a Justice who votes more similarly to Justice Alito.  The
resulting 5-4 Staunch Conservative majority in the next four years will
shift the constitutional law of abortion, same-sex marriage, property
rights, federal commerce power, school prayer, affirmative action, and
other matters substantially to the right, even though public opinion
has remained unchanged on these matters.  Should that Republican
President be caught with his or her hand in the till, Democrats gain
control of the White House in 2020, and that Democratic President
replaces Justice Antonin Scalia with a Justice who votes more simi-
larly to Justice Kagan, the resulting 5-4 Solid Liberal majority will ini-
tiate a sharp constitutional swing of similar magnitude to the left.
These swings are entirely unrelated to any change in public opinion or
social conditions with respect to any constitutional issue.  In condi-
tions of elite polarization and conflict extension, any change in voting
behavior for any reason is likely to result in dramatic changes in the
constitutional law of almost every constitutional issue.
Perhaps nothing is particularly wrong with such sharp swings in
American constitutional law.  Such swings are possible in a country
without a judicially enforceable constitution.  If most elections are
close contests between a committed liberal party and a committed
conservative party, the legality of same-sex marriage and affirmative
action, as well as the government’s willingness to adopt certain health
care programs and immigration policies, will swing as wildly as the
election returns.  If the point of constitutionalism is to mediate such
public mood swings, so much the worse for constitutionalism.  The
people can always decide to mediate electoral mood swings on their
own by voting for the status quo or building a party committed to
more centrist policies.
This erratic course of fundamental rights and regime principles
may nevertheless undermine constitutionalism.  Constitutionalism
normally requires some rule by the dead in order to empower officials
and organize politics, establish the rule of law and make credible com-
mitments, prevent self-dealing by governing officials, promote the
public interest, assert national aspirations, and entrench those consti-
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tutional compromises that preserve national unity.284  Constitutional
yo-yos threaten many of these constitutional purposes.  Constitutions
are poor means for asserting national aspirations when the constitu-
tional status of same-sex marriage, federal regulatory power, and
property rights changes substantially by the decade.  Rule of law and
credible commitment values are jeopardized when no one can be as-
sured that basic constitutional norms will last past the next election.
Strong majoritarians have fair responses to these dire predictions.
Democracies give the public the right to decide the weight of various
constitutional purposes.  Popular majorities, democrats think, are best
positioned to determine whether a change in regime outweighs needs
for credible commitments or an enduring policy on same-sex mar-
riage. Moreover, the threat to constitutional values is not quite as dire
as the above paragraphs may have suggested.  Constitutional law deals
exclusively with what Sandy Levinson has called the “constitution of
conversation” and not with what he declares to be the “constitution of
settlement.”285  The constitution of conversation consists of those
clauses, such as the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
whose meaning is disputable.  By comparison, the constitution of set-
tlement consists of those clauses, such as the inauguration day clause,
whose meaning is indisputable.  Thus, even if all of the constitutional
law found in the traditional constitutional casebook is up for grabs in
the next series of elections, most of the Constitution remains stable.
The Supreme Court is not being asked to reconsider bicameralism, the
four year presidential term, the basic processes by which a bill be-
comes law and the existence of a federal court system.  To this we
might add the enormous amount of constitutional law that does not
seem to be the subject of dispute between liberals and democrats.
This would include such cases as Marbury v. Madison,286 Brown v.
Board of Education,287 Gibbons v. Ogden,288 and Gideon v. Wain-
wright.289  These stabilities in themselves are probably sufficient to
preserve most vital constitutional purposes.
284. See 1 HOWARD GILLMAN, MARK A. GRABER, & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT 7-10 ( 2013).
285. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 17-27 (2012).
286. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
287. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
288. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
289. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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The problem with this democratic majoritarian justification for
constitutional yo-yos is that the impending destabilization of constitu-
tional law is a consequence of the less majoritarian features of the
American constitutional regime and not of a public that erratically
shifts from relatively extreme conservative to relatively extreme lib-
eral views on all issues of the day.  The American public is not as
polarized as the American elite.290 The more centrist majority of
Americans (or at least the more centrist median voter in the United
States) is having increased difficulty maintaining relative centrist poli-
cies on most constitutional issues for two reasons.  First, a constitu-
tional system in which most national officials are selected in local
elections has a tendency to generate Presidents and members of Con-
gress more polarized than the general electorate.291  Second, the prac-
tice of appointing highly educated, affluent, partisan lawyers to the
Supreme Court in the present circumstances of elite polarization prac-
tically guarantees a court divided between Solid Liberals and Staunch
Conservatives, even though less than a third of the public fit into ei-
ther of those relative extreme categories.  For both these reasons, the
course of American constitutional law is unlikely to reflect consist-
ently either the sentiments of the largely centrist median American
voter or the ideals championed by any particular elite constitutional
thinker.
The Cure.  The best cure for constitutional yo-yos is a return to
electoral stability, elite consensus, and conflict diffusion.  History sug-
gests that American constitutional law will avoid lurching from right
to left only if one of these three foundations for constitutional stability
is restored.  Electoral stability assures that constitutional law consist-
ently reflects the constitutional vision of a relatively enduring domi-
nant national coalition.  Elite consensus assures that constitutional law
consistently reflects the common constitutional vision of highly edu-
cated, affluent Republican and Democratic lawyers.  Conflict diffu-
sion prevents polarization on particular issues from having a
disproportionate impact on the entire corpus of constitutional law.
Judicial minimalism is the best preventative for constitutional yo-
yos.  Cass Sunstein, the leading proponent of that approach to the ju-
dicial function in constitutional cases, asserts, “[a] court that leaves
290. See sources cited supra notes 159, 217.
291. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 35-




things open will not foreclose options in a way that may do a great
deal of harm.”292  Narrow judicial rulings also promote further demo-
cratic deliberation on complex constitutional issues.  Sunstein writes,
“minimalist rulings increase the space for further reflection and de-
bate at the local, state, and national levels, simply because they do not
foreclose subsequent decisions.”  Justices committed to judicial
minimalism do not declare capital punishment unconstitutional, insist
that Congress has no right to regulate independent expenditures, rule
that states may never use race in the admissions process, or defer any-
time the federal government whispers the phrase “commerce clause”
in oral argument.  Instead, they support rulings limited to either the
particular manifestation of a broader constitutional issue before the
court or a fairly small subset of the broader constitutional problems.
By deciding only, for example, that Congress may not pass this partic-
ular ban on independent expenditures, the Justices leave open the
possibility that other bans might be sustained in light of more mature
public deliberation, changes in social conditions or, frankly, changes in
the composition of the court.
Judicial minimalism is particularly appropriate during times of
electoral volatility, elite polarization, and conflict extension.  Justices
may justifiably issue broader rulings when either there is a general
consensus among the voting public, measured by consistent support
for a particular political coalition, or among persons who seriously re-
flect about legal matters, measured by a consensus among legal elite,
that a particular constitutional direction best achieves American con-
stitutional aspirations.  Courts may be leading public opinion in these
circumstances, but they are leading an opinion at least prone to follow
the Justices.  Justices who initiate or continue constitutional yo-yos re-
alize none of the benefits of judicial activism while bringing about
many of the defects.  Constitutional decisions that are likely to be re-
versed or severely modified within a decade do not give the United
States a distinctive constitutional character and they do not enable the
court to play the role of “republican schoolmaster.”293  All such deci-
sions are likely to do is move the Court further from the more centrist
public and provide further irritation for an already over-irritated con-
stitutional polity.
292. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1999).
293. See generally Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmasters, 1967 SUP.
CT. REV., 1967, at 127, 127.
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For better or worse, Justices are unlikely to act consistently with
minimalist principles in the near future.  Mark Tushnet has noted that
“natter(ing) at justices” in law reviews has almost no effect.294  Most
Justices, one expects, enter office with the confidence that the most
recent election is a harbinger of the future success of their preferred
political coalition.  If so, perhaps the best advice this Article can offer
is that all of us who teach constitutional law ought to be prepared to
rewrite our lectures on a regular basis.
294. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 155 (1999).
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